Questions to answer (Select 2):
1. How well did the delegations function as allies? What might this tell us about the real peace process?
2. Were new conflicts created? Why?
3. Were you frustrated? Why? How do you think real participants may have felt?
4. What was most successful about the conference? Least?
Nation specific questions (Answer your nation’s Q):
• US – Why did you abandon your core beliefs in national self-determination when you held a veto over reparations?
• GB – Disarmament was extremely vague, with no specific limitations beyond a number of troops. Why were there no specific provisions addressing issues such as naval vessels, air forces, WMD, heavy weapons, etc.?
• France – What was your strategy to ensure reparations? Without these, you are economically devastated.
• Yugoslavia/Poland/Arab Emirates – Are you satisfied with the outcome and your status at the end of the conference? Why/Why not? What was your biggest “victory”? Worst “defeat”?
• China – What were your key goals and objectives?
• Japan – Do you feel that you were treated in a manner befitting your nation’s status? Why/Why not?
Italy - I almost forgot about you! Now you know how Italy felt at the Conference. Should you be blamed for your previous alliance with Germany?
Due Monday AM
71 comments:
1) I felt that the countries delegations being considered allies with one another puts a strain on what the definition of allies is because although we may have come to some common consensuses we were all in it for only our nations gain and no one else’s. This shows how hectic and difficult the real process must have been because the conference did little to bring the countries together and more to make them rivals.
2) Some conflicts that were created were land holdings in the pacific lack of any kind of self determination and massive debt on an already war torn Europe getting made worse by incompetence on almost every side.
3) Yes, lack of moral, logical or rational guidance on the part of almost every country especially one that begin with an f.
4) Most successful was probably the middle east and the least was probably Asia or Africa or maybe reparations they were all really bad it’s hard to tell Asia was broken up into three major sections with both China and Japan at each other’s throats and Korea in between with no clause in the treaty about whether or not someone can Jump in and claim it for themselves at a later time only that they are sovereign for at the end of this conference. Africa got vetoed so whatever France wanted change didn’t happen and now that was open for England to do as they please. And Reparations though I didn’t see the end seemed like money was only going to the big three which would cause the other nations to resent them especially America which wasn’t even for reparations in the first place.
As Japan I felt that by being put in the back mocked the status of our country and made us seem lesser than other less powerful nations. Also the lack of power all the countries seemed degrading not just to Japan but to anyone who wasn’t France, the US of A or England. All in all I feel that the conference would just make everyone angry with each other and cause more conflict in the longrun.
3. I was sort of frustrated with how the conference went. My biggest complaint, which the real participants must have felt, was being shunned to the back of the room. China was treated with this disrespect in the actual conference because they are not a white European country without much influence on the outcome. Because of this, I felt my participation and worthy contributions I could have made were unimportant and somewhat useless. I was also frustrated with the veto power that the Great Powers had, because this made it extremely difficult to get anything productive done.
4. What was most successful about this conference was the fact that we passed some decent resolutions, however, I do not see any stand-out successes. If anything, it was quite a failure since no reparations were passed. This means that the countries who gave so much of their nations for the success of the war will receive nothing in return, and that Germany and Austria-Hungary receive no punishment. Another failure was the outcome of disarmament, which simply limited the number of troops in a couple of countries and failed to mention large and dangerous weapons. The greatest failure is that we were unable to establish New Scotland, which was a result of Mr. Kirby stalling the vote on this matter.
CHINA - China really didn’t have terribly much to do with the outcome of this conference. It’s main interest was protecting itself from imperialistic powers, namely Japan, and having its territories that Japan had invaded returned to it. We had the goal of receiving some reparations, since China contributed a lot of food to the Allies, as well as some troops who worked behind the front lines. This money would have been used to improve internal transportation so that trade would be better. But since reparations failed, this won’t happen. However, China was successful in getting back its territorial possessions and gaining some new ones in the Pacific. Japan didn’t put up too much of a fight, so it was pretty simple. China is pleased with the overall outcome of the conference since it got its land back and is safe from being taken over.
France:
Delegations were pretty much split between the 3 main powers, France, Great Britain and the US, and the other smaller countries. The countries with the veto power tended to work together, for we had the power to undermine all other countries. If one country vetoed, the entire amending process would be disregarded, so the three countries tended to band together. “Secret Alliances” were also made between certain countries when the debate was not in session. I believe that this does reflect the relationships and dynamics between delegations during the real peace process because without alliances, nothing would have ever passed. New conflicts were created when negotiations weren’t strictly written during the committee sessions. When topics were left to debate on the floor, many countries disregarded the conclusions previously made. Also, when amendments were vetoed or did not pass on the floor, the debate basically had to start over from square one. This was extremely difficult to think of amendments and ideas to be debated on the spot. During the debate I was extremely frustrated because when agreements were made between two countries, at some points the other country backed out on the decision and that could mean the amendment did not pass. Also, many nations did not listen to what other nations had to say and only worried about their own nation. This made it extremely difficult to come to an agreement; with every passed amendment, 3 others had been either vetoed, disregarded or lost the majority vote. I believe this process must have been ten times worse for the actual participants of the treaty, for their own countries were on the line. It is difficult to not be selfish, but when all nations are selfish, nothing is negotiated. I believe that the most successful part of the conference was the proposition on the League of Nations. Most countries unanimously agreed upon the qualifications; despite the amount of time it took, the proposition passed was very fair. The least successful part of the conference was reparations. We debated over the figures of money for such a long amount of time that we never were able came to a negotiation.
Our strategy to insure negotiations was to show other nations through statistics of our losses how much money we as a nation deserved. France out of all of the countries in the treaty was devastated the most, and should have received the most reparations. Other countries seemed to understand the severity of our losses, but were more concerned in claiming, in some cases, 10 million more than they had originally negotiated for. Despite the relatively small amount being asked for in the scheme of things, that money had to be taken out of one of the big 3 nation’s reparations but none were willing. The big three nations finally came up with a plan that would have worked, but Great Britain chose to abstain at the last minute. Without that one vote, the smaller countries won the majority.
2. New conflicts were certainly created at the debate – in fact, more conflicts seem to have been created than solved. While technically everyone going into the debate were allies, differing agendas, stubborn personalities, and the French led to eventual disunity within the conference, which greatly impeded true progress. Specifically, the territorial resolutions led to strong disagreements between countries. In the Pacific, the other delegations were united against Japan in confiscating its imperialist holdings and dismantling its empire. In Africa, control of waterways and protection of shores led to infighting among Great Britain and a nation that seemed to be being difficult on purpose (which shall remain nameless, but starts with “F” and sort of rhymes with “Pants”). In Europe, despite rather lackluster protests from the United States, autonomous countries were included as payment, or even spoils of war, to countries represented at the treaty. Additionally, in reparations, the loose affiliation of lesser but lovable lands (dibs on that band name) was able to stick it to the major powers by voting down all reparations; their need of money (particularly in France) would force them to be more generous to the oppressed yet hard-working and good-looking delegates in the back. It seems that this treaty managed to find the equal ground that would make everybody the least satisfied possible, and anger at broken alliances, abandoned principles, and silly berets created more conflicts than the treaty itself solved.
4. While not the most successful, certainly the most impressive moment of the conference was the creation of an even more useless League of Nations than the one created in history, an act thought almost laughably impossible going into the treaty. The most successful moment in terms of actually resolving issues would probably be territorial resolution in the Middle East (as this was the only issue that was actually solved, it didn’t have much competition for this honor). A new nation was established and division of land and control of water was agreed upon almost painlessly. The most successful moment in terms of precedent, however, may have been in reparations. The coalition of lesser powers finally overcame their differences and the major powers in what is not only a nifty zeugma, but an important lesson to those who would abuse their veto power. As the nations this coalition opposed needed the money the most, the rejection of the proposal for reparations will force them to be much more generous to the united bloc of other countries, or lead to complete economic collapse and subsequent annexation as the state of New Scotland, or Nova Caledonia. While possibilities for least successful moments abound in this treaty, a probable winner of this dubious honor would be disarmament. Written so vaguely that its author will probably become President, nothing at all was solved – debate took place over the disarmament for countries that no longer existed, and the issue of Chinese and Japanese disarmament was entirely ignored by the other powers (except for when they were busy vetoing Chinese and Japanese suggestions . . . and by “they” I mean “France”). Of course, the greatest failure that history will hold us in contempt for is our failure to dismantle the country of France. While given a record number of three periods in the time-out corner, each time France was saved at the last minute, twice by filibusters and once by the veto of a meddlesome, supposedly isolationist country in the West (without naming any names, but its initials were USA).
As the Japanese delegation leader, I was outraged by the disrespect with which our glorious empire was treated during the conference. Even our basic seating arrangement, at the back of the room, isolated us from the main debate and kept attention away from us. Although both Italy and Japan were considerable powers at this time, neither nation was granted any particular power (as the United States, Great Britain, and France had been) in the League of Nations, despite protests from both delegations. Our opinions were ignored on the War Guilt clause, our empire was the only one damaged (and by an otherwise unanimous vote), our disarmament situation was mandated but otherwise ignored, and our reparations were practically minimum wage. As a very powerful maritime force that had contributed a deceptive amount to the war effort, this predicament was maddening.
But at least we weren’t the French.
As a representative of the newly autonomous Arab Emirates I felt satisfied with the outcome of the conference, our goal to become an independent state was recognized and were were joint control of the Red sea with the British. Becoming an independent state was our major goal and it was definitely our biggest victory. Our worst defeat was reparations, however this was no big deal because the Arab Emirates would have only been allotted about 5 million from Austria and Hungary. Overall as a country we surpassed our goals and were proud of our debating, alliances, and accomplishments.
1) The other members of the delegations did not seem to function well as allies where many turned on Japan and France other alliances were strong as between the Arab Emirates and Britain. This definitely says something about the real Versailles Conference because if there can be conflicts like those seen at the Mock Versailles where the delegates knew one another and held no ties to the country they were assigned one can only imagine how difficult the real peace making process was.
3) During the conference I really was frustrated, especially when a motion was made to close debate and as a representative I still had something to say on the topic that was most frustrating. Also a certain country that speaks a romance language that isn't Italian was incredible in the way they vetoed so many proposals, even some that they had proposed. The ability of the United States, France, and Great Britain to veto was the most irritating part of the conference because unless all of them were in agreement with the proposal it was shot down and the smaller countries could not do anything about it. The real participants of Versailles, especially representatives from countries other than the big three, must have been driven mad by having little say in the outcome and future of their own countries.
I was frustrated at several times during the conference. I was frustrated at first in the reparations session. I wanted to know what the U.S. wanted in order to get reparations guaranteed for France. The U.S. delegation was acting in a political manner and was not willing at first to give a straight answer on what they wanted. I was very focused on working to get a deal done and all I needed for them was something to get the negotiating started. I was finally able to get the numbers from them and a deal was worked out. This temporarily ended my frustration. I was again frustrated when after the three different major powers agreed to a deal in private that Britain then did not vote for the proposal in the committee session. I was very frustrated that they went back on their word, got greedy, and did not support the proposal. We had a deal that would have given us over four billion in payments for economic recovery and they backed out. I was shocked and frustrated. I was also frustrated when our country kept getting penalized for breaking house rules when in fact we really did not do anything worthy of punishment especially as other countries were breaking the rules at the same time. I was also frustrated that we kept having to veto proposals. Our group attempted to express what we wanted to see and what our limitations were but these were ignored by the rest of the delegations and we were forced to veto. The real delegates probably felt this way too because the countries were trying to not give away too much information which would give the other countries an advantage. I think that not knowing all of the things the other side wants is common when having negotiations and a lot of concessions are what you are willing to do to get a deal done.
I think the most successful thing about the conference was our ability to make a deal and agree on the size and geography of territories. No major amendments were made on the size of the countries in the floor session. This was the only area in which nearly all countries agreed. The minor area where there was an amendment was Korea but, every country agreed to make it free except for Japan. Together we were able to make compromises in committees greatly speeding up the floor sessions. The least successful part of the conferences was the rigid format. This prevented countries from making compromises and agreements after the floor sessions had started. This prevented deals which are necessary in negotiations in order to get things done. I thought we make compromises when we could but it was too hard to make them.
Our plan for ensuring reparations was not properly calculated. We expected every country to be greatly in favor of gaining reparations from Germany. This was not the case. While it was in everyone’s interest to gain reparations from Germany it was not enough of a desire by the minor powers. Our plan focused on convincing the United States to support our reparations, which was much easier than we imagined, and assuming that the other countries would go along with us. We did not even imagine that the minor countries would consider spiting us just so that we would not get any reparations. In hindsight, we should have “bought” two countries by giving them obscene amounts of money that they could not have turned down and given the other countries next to nothing. We also expected that no matter what we would get reparations as long as the proposal left committee with reparations in it as we could veto all amendments removing the reparations. Really, we took reparations for granted something we should not have done even though we had a deal and Great Britain backed out at the last minute.
Nation: Poland!
Throughout the Versailles conference, I became extremely frustrated. One of the most frustrating aspects was when France or any of the Major Powers vetoed proposals or amendments. I found it extremely unfair that even if the majority of people voted for an amendment, it was able to be thrown away simply if France voted against it. I imagine this angered the real participants greatly, especially because there were many other newly independent states, like Poland, who were overshadowed by the Big Three and their notorious veto power. I was also extremely frustrated when delegations who promised to vote in our favor decided to deceive Poland and stab us in the back. I found this to be very immature and unprofessional. I would also imagine that the real participants were not a fan of this either, especially nations with less authority and power, like Poland. “Bigger” nations feel that it is okay to lie to and deceive “smaller” nations just because they are “superior” to them. I realize this is politics, but I still don’t think this is fair and to say that there is equality, such as in the League of Nations, is complete hypocrisy. Finally, I found it absolutely ridiculous that a nation like Poland who lost so much during the war, including 1,128,000 total deaths, could not receive appropriate reparations. The major powers were too arrogant to grant 3 million dollars from GERMANY. It wasn’t even their money they were giving up. Especially when Yugoslavia, who lost barely a quarter of what Poland did in the war, was able to get equal if not more reparations than Poland, where is the logic in that? I believe that this as well would have both angered and appalled the real participants.
I felt the most successful part of the conference was definitely the territories. During this section, delegations were actually able to make productive gains. For instance, Poland gained back land it had lost during the war in addition to gaining new lands. This was a huge accomplishment for a newly developing nation. I felt the least successful part of the conference was without a doubt the reparations. I find it pathetic that no one got any reparations. In essence, we let Germany win with reparations. Instead of being able to compromise with each other, we all caused ourselves to ultimately fail. We all got no money to repair our nations from the devastating war and Germany did not have to pay for the damages they caused.
Overall, I was satisfied with our outcome at the end of the conference. Although we did not get any reparations, we still gained many of our objectives. Our most important objective was to become liberated from the Central Powers, which we achieved. In addition to this, we gained extra lands such as West Prussia and Galicia. This was absolutely our biggest “victory”. I think our worst “defeat” (along with every other delegation’s) was the reparations. We received no reparations because the delegations could not compromise and work together. For a nation like Poland who was absolutely devastated by the war and a new-born nation, this is extremely detrimental. Poland has no way of building itself up at all without reparations. Instead of flourishing as a new independent state, Poland would suffer indefinitely without reparations and need some sort of outside aid or help. This would then cause them to be weak and dependent on other nations and therefore subject to imperialism once again. But overall, I felt the conference was a good learning experience and although quite stressful, was also pretty fun.
The function of delegates as allies was shaky to say the least. Alliances were precarious at best and downright volatile if portrayed in the right way. Often conflicts would ensue between allies due to differences in interest. No two countries in the conference had vested interests that did not overlap in some shape or fashion with the interests of another country. Hence, alliances could not be depended on. For example, the US proposal for reparations, making a budget total of 10billion was abstained upon by the British even though they had previous agreed in the 2 minute suspension of rules, causing the amendment to fail. Instead, they proposed their own amendment which raised reparations to 11billion, most of the additional money going to themselves and the French. Things like that were absolutely commonplace during the conference. They were frustrating, and frankly, inevitable.
Frustration ran high through most of the conference. One the major sources were the aforementioned annoying back stabs and squabbling by other allies. The veto power wielded by the other two great powers seemed almost ludicrous. In one instance, France was the sole dissenting vote on an issue. However, because they wielded veto power, the were able to kill the bill. The veto power granted to the three great powers may have been relatively fair in theory, but in practice, it created an absolute nightmare. Compromise was key and the United States was forced to do away with many of their 14 points, like in the real compromise, in the interest of drafting a proposal that would not be vetoed by either Great Britain or France. However, probably most frustrating was the spite that pervaded the conference. At no better time was it shown than when a bill proposing the annexation of France by Britain and being renamed to New Scotland. While this in itself may not have been frustrating, these underlying feelings of animosity and enmity did cause problems. For the US, they ruined one of the most critical bills within Versailles. The bill on reparations that the US drafted (and that Britain made minor modifications to in the interest of obtaining $400 million additional) passed as an amendment. However, when it came time to vote on the whole reparations bill, it failed. Why? because the minor countries felt spiteful and wanted to ruin the bill. Countries like Yugoslavia, who were to be given reparations that were previously perfectly acceptable to them instead decided to veto the reparations bill in favor of spiting the larger nations.
To the contrary I do not feel the United States abandoned their core beliefs as much as resigning themselves to an impossible victory. As it was, holding a veto over the countries heads would have been pointless as it was vetoed anyways by a combined majority of smaller lesser powers. Even considering that, the United States did still manage to secure a significantly larger amount of self determination around the world than in the real life Versailles conference. Shandong and Kai Chu was given back to the Chinese as the rightful owners, Korea and the Arab Emirates were given sovereignty, and although the United States was not able to leave all of Africa to self determination, at least a sizable fraction of it was. On my part, I participated in the Pacific Territories committee, and a problem I had reconciling was the holdings that the US maintained in the Pacific (the Philippines) while preaching self-determination to other countries. This along with the fact that in the real treaty of Versailles, all the Pacific islands did end up being carved up and given to European powers as well as Shandong falling to the Japanese allowed for a mindset set for inevitable failure; so much so that even the objectives in my own green paper were terribly unambitious. It seemed a stroke of miracle even when Japan conceded territory that they had captured in China AND allowed Korea to become sovereign, and seeing as that was significantly better than in the real Treaty of Versailles, I took it and ran, thankful for what I had obtained, not trying to bother bargaining for more.
1. The delegations did not function very well as allies. Every nation seemed a bit too “self-determined” in what they would gain from the spoils of war. Though yes every nation was concerned about the price Germany should pay for reparations, everyone seemed to be trying to get as much as they could from it. And once one nation felt that the share wasn’t equally distributed on the basis of efforts, others would too stand in revolt in demand for more. Yet the nations with veto power were constantly against letting the lower nations take a bigger share. Then once the big powers finally conceded, the lesser nations all voted “nay” only to spite France for their uncooperativeness. This shows how pride got in the way of trying to do what is best for the nation. In relation to the actual participants in the treaty this may actually be a realistic reenactment of the struggles between the nations. This mock conference can show at a small level how belligerent the demands of the nations were to gain back what was lost during the war while having to divide up a finite resource.
3. Due to the major powers having the ability to veto bills and amendments, this led to the disheartening of the lesser nations. When one of the lower nations tried to make an amendment which would have a majority favor it, a major power (France) would usually veto it. This led to the lesser nations voting “nay” to spite France when they voted “aye” for something which benefited them. The real delegates in the Treaty of Versailles were probably even more frustrated with the treaty because many nations never obtained what they had hoped for. In actuality some nations didn’t attend the conference due to being discouraged.
4. Arab Emirates: As a member of the group for the Arab Emirates, I feel that we came out of the conference quite successful. Our greatest accomplishment was becoming an independent nation, being accepted into the League of Nations, and reclaiming a large amount of land from the Ottoman Empire. Though our worst defeat was in reparations. We were originally going to get one million dollars but we found that since other nations were demanding more we should as well and raised it to 4 million. Yet on the final vote the “nays” outweighed the “ayes” and since we no longer had the time for the conference, reparations were never resolved.
1. Alliances proved to be quite feeble in our version of the Versailles Conference. Leading up to the event, my delegation made arrangements to work cooperatively with smaller nations, such as Italy, and the Arab Emirates, those plans however quickly fell to pieces when on the floor, most apparently in my own committee, reparations. Technically our Allies were Great Britain and France, but due to their historical track record of seeking to impose punitive measures on Germany, I believed that they would become my opposition in the negotiations of reparations. Allying myself and my nation with smaller countries seeking self-determination seemed like an effective approach to aging support for a modest and reasonable reparations packet. However, the conference took a few twists and turns, and France and Great Britain became my allies when discussing reparations. Rather than invoke cries of punishing Germany, the British and French made persuasive cases as to their war contributions and their worthiness and the smaller nations, despite only asking for relatively small amounts, became the burdens on the total sum that I had previously believed Great Britain and France would be. This reveals a great deal about the real peace process, most essentially that it is constantly evolving and changing. Ideas and viewpoints are sometimes very closed to negotiations, but at other times they can shift 180 degrees. Most importantly you must always stick to you convictions in you decision making and be prepared for betrayal and dissension. The United States was opposed to alliances for a reason, ultimately the only person you can trust is yourself.
3. Frustration was most definitely a major part of the Conference, and I do not doubt that the real participants felt discouraged, enraged, and fed up throughout their own experience. The bulk of my frustrations stemmed from being overlooked. My proposal to amend the original reparations bill was something that I believed was fair and well-though out, but it was immediately ignored. I can only imagine how the real delegates felt when their own proposals that were the culmination of long hours of hard work and research were simply thrown out. I also didn't even had a real stake in the conference, but when a nation tried to take something away from the United States, I felt an obligation to take back what might have not even been mine. The veto power allowed to my nation as a large power afforded my team a sizable advantage in passing our own proposals, but the smaller nations must have felt great exasperation in having less of a say.
Nation Specific Question (United States): Overall, I felt that the communication between committees broke down in the actual floor session, and our initial aims may have been a bit lost in translation. With a victory for the self-determination of the Arab Emirates and the successful passage of the League of Nations along with the protection of Shangdong, the United States was riding high. Consequently we were willing to make concessions in the area of territorial divisions. One of the major problems at the actual Versailles Conference was a lack of compromise, and despite sacrificing our core belief in some areas of the world, we were able to maintain it in other parts of the world. I felt that overall the committees did not overlap during the floor session, it seemed that the committee at hand was the only one discussed, and during the initial reparations committee, no nation seemed to be grossly unreasonable in its demands, and therefore threats were not deemed necessary.
1.The delegations did not function well as allies at all. Each country was being extremely nationalistic and was almost unwilling to change their goals to aid their so-called allies. At times my country, China, would side with our allies when it was beneficial for us, but we were unwilling to compromise our ideals for the most part. As a lesser power, as well as an Asian country, we were stuck in the back of the conference and our major powered allies such as Great Britain and the USA did not need our support to pass their bill and in the real conference they would not have viewed us as equals. This difficulty in keeping alliances could tell us that during the actual conference peace was extremely difficult to obtain. I believe that it could have been easier to keep alliances at the actual conference however than in our mock Versailles Conference because many decisions in voting were made because of a dislike for the delegates in a certain country, like France. A country in the actual conference would have been only concerned with their country and not spiting another, so peace could have been a little easier, but in no shape easy to attain.
3. During the conference I was very frustrated at times with the proceedings of the conference. When France kept voting nay to an amendment to the disarmament bill so that Japan and China could decide together their own disarmament, it was upsetting. They were being spiteful because one of China’s delegates suggested annexing France to the British, which would have never happened in the real conference. I was also upset that reparations never passed so no country could get the money they needed to rebuild their countries after fighting such a devastating war. The real participants must have been much more frustrated than me because they were actually fighting for their country and how it would be viewed in the post-war world.
China- Our goals and objectives were mainly to get back all the land we lost during the course of the war as well as keep Japan from getting any stronger or gaining more territory in the Pacific. During the conference we were able to get back all our lost land, take Korea away from Japan, and our arms reduction would have been the same as Japan, so they did not get too powerful. China got all of the things we wanted, and if we had gotten the 7 million dollars in reparations that one of the amendments to the bill proposed, we would have come out richer than before the war.
1. The in class Versailles conference in terms of delegate’s relations was very similar with many delegates getting very heated on the different problems that they were trying to solve. In our conference the delegations did not function well as allies, everyone was more worried about their own countries and not about the greater good. Although there were some friendly gestures in terms of making amends to the proposed bills of the treaty, ultimately each countries delegation were worried about themselves rather than their allies. You would almost not know that all of these countries at the conference were allies because even when particular countries had nothing to lose they did not want their “allies” to gain certain things. This is similar to the real peace process because in the real peace process it took the countries a very long time to reach an agreement because everyone wanted to get their own countries more. Also in the real peace treaties when some countries did not get what they wanted they just left the conference.
2. During the conference it was very evident that I was frustrated, especially when I was accused of breaking the rules and getting my team penalized, when I was really going by the rule book and the other countries were out to get my country. Although at the real conference I don’t believe delegates got angry over time penalties, I am sure that they did get very angry over small things after dealing with other countries for such a long time. Also at the real conference I am sure that on certain parts of the treaty being debated upon countries held grudges on other countries for previous bills on the treaty. In our Versailles conference countries clearly held grudges an example being when the other countries attempted turn France into another country. These grudges being held did not allow the delegations to come to the agreements that needed to be reached by the deadline. I was upset that grudges against my country in particular affected our ability to help form amends to the bills, because other countries weren’t looking at facts in deciding to vote against things but rather just personal reasons.
France
Reparations were my specific job for the treaty which is why I am very upset we didn’t get what we wanted when in the individual committees I fought for 5 billion. Our original plan coming into the treaty negotiations was to receive full compensation for all French lives lost during the war both civilian and military, and to also get all the money we spent back from the Germans, along with enough money to rebuild the Northern edge of our country which was destroyed by the Germans. The infrastructure destroyed by the Germans during the war affect Frances economy very negatively which was why we wanted to fight for money to rebuild it. Unfortunately we knew we would have to compromise with the United States who wanted everyone to get small amounts of reparations compared to the large amounts we wanted. To compromise we lowered our actual asking price which was in the 10 billion range to 5 billion which was allowed by the United States and also Great Britain. With the support of the other two great powers we knew that we could get the reparations we needed, which we would have if it weren’t for the breaking of an agreement by Great Britain who abstained from the vote when we needed one more vote. Of course after they didn’t help us pass the vote the smaller countries decided to sacrifice their reparations in order to destroy Frances economy and voted it down. They of course had no reason for their actions other than hate for France and the other big powers use of the Veto.
Country: The great Yugoslavia
I believe that the Great nation of Yugoslavia had one of the most successful days of any country in the conference. We were not even a nation before the conference but during the conference we acted like and were treated as one of the more powerful nations in the room. I am very satisfied with our status with the outcome of the conference because we gained many of the things we wanted from the conference, and if we did not get what we wanted, we made sure other countries were even less successful than us. A great example of this is in Reparations. Yugoslavia lost similar amounts of people as Great Britain and had countless battles fought on our land, and yet was receiving 100x less reparations than they were. And when we asked for a mere 6 million dollars extra, when other countries were asking for billions (with a b) our proposal was shot down. This is when we saw that the money we were allotted to receive would help our economy, but not make any sort of large impact on it and were willing to sacrifice it. Our willingness to sacrifice our reparations along with many of the lesser powers increased our economic standing in many cases. Because of the voting down of Reparations, the powerful nations lost billions of dollars which would cause their economy to be in ruins. Our economy would suffer as well, but it would be able to rebound much quicker than that of the big 3 which could increase our power as a nation even more. Reparations could easily be looked upon as both our greatest victory and biggest defeat because if we were offered the true amount of money we deserved as a nation, we would have easily accepted the bill and everyone would live happily ever after… except France because they never seem to be happy, those party poopers.
4. We had many successes during the conference that helped strengthen our nation. We were able to become our own nation, receive large amounts of land from the former Austro- Hungarian empire, receive military supplies through disarmament of Germany, and gain economic power by dismantling the economies of the Big 3. One of the perks of being stuck in the back of the room was the ability for the lesser nations to discuss, plan, and team up to create strong alliances against the big 3. The back of the room was like the back of a middle school bus, it was where the cool and truly powerful kids were seated. The unity of the lesser nations throughout the conference was one of the major successes because we were able to unite with the common idea of distrust of the big powers and were able to show our power together through treaties such as reparations. The least successful aspect was that of disarmament. I was in the committee and we had many powerful proposals that would limit the heavy arms of Germany that were ignored over disputes in troop sizes for Germany. We needed to prevent military production and heavy weaponry production but we left that aspect of the proposal. But at least Yugoslavia was a major factor in why they don’t have to pay $10 billion dollars in damages so Germany will hopefully like us with their not really disarmed at all army and their not really hurt that much economy.
3. The conference had a large amount of factors that caused waves of frustration throughout the room. The veto power of the big 3 was easily the most notable cause of frustration because if one of the powers did not like an idea, they could easily veto it. Also, many countries would go against the ideals that their country had in the real conference which caused allies to switch throughout the whole conference. Besides the unity of the lesser nations in the back of the room during disarmament, no true allies were formed during the conference who would stick with each other throughout the whole process. Each country was very nationalistic and was not able to see effects of bills beyond their own borders. When it is truly your own country at stake, it would be even tougher for anything to get passed in the true conference. The livelihood of your country is at stake and most delegates were willing to do whatever it took to protect their own ideals.
The Conference as a whole was a very fun experience and really opened your eyes to the difficulty of the peace conference. If only Yugoslavia was run by the delegates we had at our conference it would still be a country right now.
1) The delegations poorly functioned as allies. Never think a nation might help you or have the same interests as you. Every nation only had one thing in mind, how they where going to better themselves and gain as much as they can for themselves. Therefore, you could never really trust your allies. They would say one thing and the next minute say something entirely different to you. Agreements were made and often broken and in the end no one won. This shows why the real peace process was so difficult. If students that are friends could not make basic agreements in a mock trial, no wonder nations in the real peace conference had such difficulty. I have never realized how difficult it is to come to an agreement that impacts so many people around the world. If one nation disagrees then the whole peace agreement can fall apart. Overall, the mock conference showed how difficult it is to make an agreement with other countries and ally yourself with out losing the best interest of your own nation and people.
3) Yes, I was frustrated. I was frustrated with how my country was treated by other countries and the lack of communication in the conference. I found it annoying and difficult that you could not discuss important decisions with your table members with out being suspended from the conference for two or more minutes-this was very unproductive. I also thought it was difficult to make agreements with other countries when we could not talk to them unless we requested a break. I think the conference might have ended better, especially in reparations, if we were able to discuss ideas more openly. I also thought it was immature and frustrating how France was targeted on purpose to have a suspension from talking. I would have been fine with it if the other countries at least used the time we could not talk to try to gain more money for themselves or something rather then immaturely and unrealistically trying to annex France/ make “New Scotland”. It was a waste of time. Plus it gained them enemies. I think real participants would also be extremely frustrated, worked up, and willing to fight to death for their countries and that is a prime example why it is so hard to make a treaty and compromise. No one is willing to bend or help another.
France: During reparations we made a deal with the other two great powers, knowing our proposal would at least not be vetoed. We all agreed and right when it would have been passed Britain changed their mind and vetoed it and then tried to take back the veto and it was too late. One country changing their mind broke our country. We needed the money to financially stabilize our country after the war and now we are devastated. I think that to make sure we would get reparations we should have been more willing to pass other less important proposals to get other countries in our favor rather then gain enemies. In the end we had too many enemies and a large need of reparations that was taken away from us because we were unwilling to compromise. Therefore, the biggest thing I take away from this mock conference is that compromise is nearly impossible when each nation only wants what is good for them, yet it can make or break a conference.
2. Were new conflicts created? Why?
Yes, conflicts were most definitely created as a direct result of our conference. This was evident in many of the committee proposals that we as a whole conference did not approve. For example, the claims on much of the African territory were not ratified and much further dispute among those territories could arise and prove to create another, deadlier war. No country, in our mock Versailles conference was able to secure lands within Africa, hence violent disputes between imperial powers would arise and a military overture. Also in no reparations were passed in the Versailles Conference, thus France will be devastated. Hence, other European powers could easily encroach on its land, as France has neither the army nor economy to fight another war directly after WWI. Also Germany is not force to pay large sums of money, thus it has the ability to economically trample the economies of the Allied Powers. Also no true agreement were formed between China and Japan, hence much hostility within the Pacific might lead to future conflicts in both the economy and land interests.
3. Were you frustrated? Why? How do you think real participants may have felt?
No, I am sure my group and I were not frustrated one bit. We luckily were able to obtain everything we set out to obtain. Our main goal was that of an Arab state within the Middle East. That proposal was easily ratified within the floor session in a matter of a minute. Our group presented our proposal for an Arab state in the Middle East and every single country approved and voted “yea.” That was a big relief that came quite easily. We simply set up a unanimous support in the committee sessions to insure that we would obtain the said support in the actual vote. The real participants may have felt much worse. The position of the Arabs in this conference made almost no difference on the actual outcome of the treaty. Only 2 lines in the actual treaty dealt with the Middle East. The Arab had virtually no power in the actual conference. First of all our delegation had a disproportional representation in the conference, and secondly everyone in our group was very intelligent about their subjects hence giving us rather an upper hand against some other countries. So the Arab delegates in the actual conference (the one or two), must have felt clear betrayal.
Arab Emirates – Are you satisfied with the outcome and your status at the end of the conference? Why/Why not? What was your biggest “victory”? Worst “defeat”?
I am very satisfied with the outcome and our status at the end of the conference. We achieved everything if not more that we set out to achieve before the beginning of the conference. We sought out to gain a nation, we achieved it. We sought out to gain land, we achieved it. We sought out for support from any of the big three powers, we obtained it. We achieved our goals. On the wayside we achieved even more. We obtained partial control of the Red Sea and complete custody of the Persian Gulf. In hindsight, if this actually happened all the oil fields would belong to the Arab state. Hence the Arab state would one day be the majority exporter of crude oil within the world. We also obtained the holy land. This is a big win for the Arab Muslims, as this would directly lead to the expulsion of Zionists before the threat of Israel would arise as the powers of the Jews grew. Our biggest victory was not the achievement of our goals, it was the fact that all the other countries were able to support our goals. This signified a clear political ability of our team to persuade others to justify our causes. Our worst defeat, although very trivial and almost completely negligible was the reparations, we lost a potential meager one million pounds. QED
1. The delegations did not function well as allies. The entire conference was strewn with backstabbing and closed door dealing. Each country only helped another when it was to their advantage. For example, during reparations, Yugoslavia asked for a addition of 8 million dollars to their reparations. This sum was insignificant compared to the twelve billion dollar total. However countries refused to accept this amendment solely because it was of no benefit to them. This shows how the real conference may have been. Although all the countries wanted the defeat of Germany, they each wanted it for a different reason. Once the war was ended, countries did not need their allies and only went after what was best for them. During our own conference, some countries seemed like they were mortal enemies. I can only imagine that real delegations, arguing for a real treaty, must have been more at each others’ throats.
3. I was extremely frustrated during the conference. Going into the conference, most countries had agreed to help us. However, as time went on, we found our small new country feeling more and more isolated and abandoned. At the end of the conference came the most frustrating committee, reparations. Yugoslavia was devastated, being a main war zone, and what little it had was destroyed. In addition around half the troops sent to war from Yugoslavia died. The small amount of money we asked for seemed reasonable. However, all the other countries obstinately refused. They seemed to ignore our arguments and pass us off as whiny beggars. This made me very frustrated. I now understand why many of the original countries backed out of the Versailles treaty. Like us, many of the real delegates must have felt slighted or misrepresented. Again, arguing for the sake of their countries rather than participation points must have greatly amplified this frustration.
Yugoslavia Question: Overall I felt Yugoslavia did well in the mock treaty. Going into the treaty I had low expectations. Yugoslavia was not only a new country but also had little pull. To tell the truth I was mostly relying on the U.S.’s self determination policy and France’s need of a buffer state to carry us through. Our two main objectives were land and money. Being a new country, our goal was to unite all Serbs and help jump start a damaged economy. Probably our most important goal, land, was accomplished. This was our greatest victory. Through alliances and trade, we managed to get most of the other delegations to agree to give us large chunks of Austria-Hungary as well as other lands. However, we did not meet our other goal. Most of our proposals for reparations were shot down by the other delegations.
1. The delegates functioned as allies as well as rubber absorbs water, it simply didn’t happen. Every nation had their own private agenda and if other supposed allies got screwed by their agenda, the general consensus was “oh well”. This undoubtedly created a very tense and argumentative mood for the entire peace process because all of the countries were trying to throw a wrench in each others plans while pining for what they personally wanted.
3. I was most certainly frustrated to the point where I began to wonder about the sanity of some of the other delegates. Sure, I understood that everyone had their own goals to accomplish, but some decisions seemed to have no rational, logical, historical, or moral roots. As the conference continued on, it seemed that this only became more and more common to the point where it felt like some people had to be tripping on some form of hallucinogenic.
While I was not part of the disarmament committee, which would show the truth of my following statement, from what I heard from those who spoke during the floor session, disarmament was vague because no one seemed certain as to what was a reasonable defensive force and argued with each other due to mismatched perceptions of a fighting force. Even during the floor session I heard people argue about numbers as low as 50,000 troops, which would not be able to hold a fortified city for more than 2 days against a determined offensive from any major army. I think that the creators behind proposal merely decided that the vague wording stepped on the least toes, so that was what they put forth.
During the Versailles Conference I did become very frustrated at times, and I believe real participants’ feelings may not have differed much when it came to the tough situations present in this tense atmosphere. I was frustrated due to the fact that Poland was pushed to the back, and almost deemed insignificant in the light of the Big Three, with their notorious advantage of having veto power. When a nation would want an amendment, and it all seemed to be going successfully, all it would take would be only one veto vote, and the whole case was thrown out, no matter how far a nation came. As a Polish delegate, I felt for the other small nations too, like Yugoslavia and even the Arab Emirates who were struggling to simply maintain a say. It was irritating to see how easily the hard efforts of so many nations could go to waste with only one veto, and I can only begin to imagine how the real participants actually felt. I believe the most successful fact about the conference was the resolution that was passed for territories. Many nations, especially new ones like Poland, were able to attain several lands without a problem, and it was great to see the ability for all the nations to compromise and make a positive as well as a big difference on this matter. Perhaps the most unsuccessful was the resolution that could not be passed on the issue of reparations. The countries that suffered many losses did not receive what they deserved, while Germany and Austria-Hungary got away without having to pay anything. On the whole, however, I was satisfied as a Polish delegate with the outcome at the end of the conference. Poland’s biggest “victory” was being liberated from the Central Powers and being established as an independent nation. Also, Poland was able to get back its previous territories and new ones which included Upper Silesia, Galicia, and the Prussian lands. Poland’s worst “defeat” was probably reparations, just like a lot of other nations. The countries failed miserably at compromising on such an important issue. For a new and growing Poland, which suffered so many casualties and internal losses, receiving no reparations would make it extremely hard for us to build our nation and cause us to be dependent on others once again. All in all, though, this conference did make many improvements and it offered an important and new learning experience for me that I will never forget.
1. If the object of the conference was to make enemies and backstab friends, I think we achieved that. However, if we were trying to create an international peace and join together as allies we failed, miserably. This was seen in several instances mainly the secret treaties that were made but not followed through with. Each delegation only thought of what they needed and only did what was to their advantage; this is understandable but was not the true purpose of the conference. For example, France and Britain created a coalition to support each other during one of the floor sessions, however when it came to it Britain did not stick to it. Again, Yugoslavia asked for an additional 8 million dollars to their reparations, and even prior to this given support from several nations, they were rejected. This was because it was in no interest to them. This animosity and greed between delegates reached high levels in a “mock” trial, the real conference with many more people must have been brutal. Though most alliances ended in failure, some were very successful. Japan and Great Britain through mutual aims and cooperation were able to work together to create a partnership that got them both what they wanted.
3. By the end of the conference I think some of us were about to pull our hair out in frustration or already did. The floor sessions were extremely frustrating. The countless rules, and the even more numerous, the shouts of “point of order”, which gave us all headaches and made things more complicated and lessened our ability to communicate with each other and reach a suitable arrangement. Furthermore the veto power of the Big Three became wearisome: hence the hatred of France. If one of them did not agree, in the end the opinion of the smaller countries did nothing and hours of debate were rendered futile. Next, the way words were twisted was exasperating. I had mentioned the number of orphans in Yugoslavia to illustrate the affect the number of dead in the war had laid on the country. This was twisted into a desperate pity plea to hamper our ability to receive adequate reparations. The overall effect of these things amounted to a situation where no one was happy and a treaty virtually powerless because so many countries backed out of it.
Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia’s birth was so recent that the conference gave it some verification. But the relative newness of the country also meant that coming into the conference we had little say. Though our ability was little our need was great: the war had ravaged our country’s population, land, and industry especially because we were in the direct area of conflict, it meant we need money and resources. Our only known allies were France who needed us as a buffer and U.S. who cried self determination. These allies did not support us as much as we had hoped. However, we had accomplished many of our goals in gaining allies through the League of Nations and in increasing our boundaries in Europe. Allies were important to us because we were so young that we need someone to support us, so that we could unify our Serbian nation. By giving concessions to other countries we were able to amass huge chunks of Austria and Hungary. Our only failure was in getting no reparations, which we need to jump start our economy, but no one got reparations.
3. Were you frustrated? Why? How do you think real participants may have felt?
I think everyone was frustrated by the proceedings in the conference. Not only were the topics discussed very easily disputed from country to country, but people had trouble maintaining any sort of decorum. Everyone became so invested in their country’s beliefs that they began fighting with vehemence and anger when their side was not taken by all. In any situation such as Versailles, it is impossible to reach a compromise that benefits all; as they say, in any compromise, everyone is only half happy. In Versialles, it seemed as though nobody was. It was difficult to pass anything when one Great Power could simply veto it, for example France. Each delegate was concerned in passing only amendments for their own country, obviously, and it was difficult to make any compromises or stay on topic. If in a simple Mock Conference, tempers were running high even though passing amendments only mattered to our grade and not our home and our families, and our career, I can only imagine how much pressure and frustration the real delegates at the Treaty Conference must have experienced.
4. What was most successful about the conference? Least?
What was most successful about the conference was the ability for some nations to work together. At the end of the conference, all of the smaller nations were able to work together to make the reparations paper fail to pass. Alliances in the conference, for example the one between the U.S. and the Middle East, were kept strong, and the Middle East attained self-determination because of it. Coincidentally, communication also seemed to be one of the least successful things at the conference. While some alliances were kept strong, it seemed like on the floor nations had trouble staying to their core beliefs, and communication between countries and even within each country was somewhat lacking. This probably stemmed from a lack of ample time to discuss how to act on each issue, but there definitely could have been improvement. For example, within the U.S., some delegates would get up and speak without the consensus of the group, and would say things that did not support our country’s beliefs. I get the feeling that this happened in more countries than just our own, and this may have cost everyone some very valuable changes in the Treaty.
U.S. Question:Throughout the entire conference, the United States worked very hard to obtain self-determination for struggling countries, such as the Middle East. We also managed to secure territories for other countries, such as China, and to secure territories in Africa which would eventually become self-determined. In addition to these successes, we were able to negotiate higher reparations for some countries like Yugoslavia in order to help them develop as a new nation. I do not believe that we abandoned our core beliefs in reparations. As it is, it would not have passed anyway due to the coalition of smaller nations, but I believe that we did our best to uphold the U.S.’s beliefs. The changes we did make were positive, and perhaps the final decisions were not perfect, but they were acceptable and better than no decision at all. We thought that we were able to secure enough reparations to keep everyone satisfied, but this was obviously not the case. The amendment we tried to pass made perfect sense and was fair to all, and we included friendly amendments to maintain every country’s happiness. Though the final paper was not perfect, it was in accordance with our beliefs and I believe that we were justified to vote for it.
Delegate: Hasher Nisar
Country: Arab Emirates
1) The delegations functioned as allies well. It really depended on the alliances formed. Our alliance with Great Britain, United States, and France helped us achieve our goal which was an independent pan-Arab state. However, France’s alliance with the United States and Great Britain did not work very well because they vetoed almost everything they supported. I also think that the alliances made a country think twice before voting an issue because they did not want to make the countries they were allied mad, especially if you were a small country like Yugoslavia or Italy.
4) The most successful thing about the conference was that Arab Emirates established their own Arab state. The Arab Emirates delegation main goal was to establish an independent state. We didn’t really care about anything else. The least successful thing about the conference was reparations. We were not able to pass a bill that would have distributed money amongst the countries. All the countries except Arab Emirates, US, Great Britain, and France voted against the bill. Since they had the majority, the bill did not pass. The countries voted against it to show the Three Big that there veto power didn’t really matter.
Arab Emirates Question:
I am really satisfied with the outcome of the conference. Going into the conference, our delegation had one goal: Create an independent Arab State. With the help of our alliances we were able to accomplish that. Because of historical documents, like the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, we thought that it would be hard to get Great Britain and France on our side but because of our delegation’s amazing skills we were able to become allies. We also were careful in mentioning the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Towards the end when I was debating with how much money Arab Emirates wanted in reparations with Great Britain, I mentioned the Sykes-Picot Agreement and they said that they had no idea what I was talking about. I was surprised that they did not know about it. Our biggest victory was creating an independent Arab State. We did not have any major defeats as that was our only goal for the whole conference but I was disappointed that the reparations bill didn’t pass. If the reparations bill had passed, we would have gotten $4 Million which would have helped us build infrastructure and develop our new country.
One of the new conflicts that I think was created in our Treaty of Versailles is between everybody, but mostly the British, and the French. France had no right to tell Great Britain not to patrol its own waters with warships, but they proceeded to do just that. The French are allowed to patrol the French coast and the coast of their colonies, but they tell the British that they cannot. The French thus vetoed the Territories Africa Bill which made everybody mad. This was the start of a huge anti-France movement within the delegation. Many attempts were made to try and hinder the French and even destroy them. Another conflict that arouse in between the lesser powers and the great powers. Because the great powers were being stingy with their money the lesser powers banded together to stop all war reparations. France and Great Britain could not afford to lose that money so they will be angry with the lesser powers.
I was frustrated when the French stuck their nose into everybody’s business. They vetoed bills that did not go their way because of Britain patrolling their own territory and Japan and China figuring out their own method of disarmament.
China did an excellent job of reaching its goals. In Territories-Pacific China not only gained back its old territory and re-opened trade in Tibet and Mongolia, but we restricted Japanese expansion to just three small islands. We did not gain the money we wished in reparations, but we did not lose any men in the war so it was much more satisfying to have France crumble into economic ruin then to get money we did not really need. Also the equal racial clause in the L.O.N really helped China and other Asian nations.
For Great Britain, from The Archduke of New Scotland:
Question 1: The various delegations seemed to do well at finding nations with similar interests, and supporting each other for collective clout. As far as the British delegation is concerned, the prospect of alliances went beautifully. The most clearly evident example of this was with the Chinese. After pushing for the Chinese to get important Pacific territories, a relationship ensued in which the Chinese came to support key British desires (such as territory in the Middle East and Pacific), both arguing for us and voting alongside us. The beauty of this arrangement came from our different spheres of interest; for the most part, the British and the Chinese either had interests that did not interfere with each other, or that could be executed together without compromising on beliefs. Despite how well we got along, I feel like the majority of the conference was marked by less clear allies. Often, plans were made, but as the ideas of one delegation changed, their vote would change from their promise. In revenge, the backstabbed nations would try to catch their rivals out of order, or vote against them. This happened when the French, who alienated the entirety of the conference and nearly lost their homeland to Great Britain. Although not this extreme, I am sure the actual conference went similarly, with delegations changing sides and double-crossing others in pursuit of their own success. It is no wonder why multiple delegations did not even sign the actual Treaty of Versailles.
Question 4: The level of frustration that we experienced during the conference began at an impossibly low level. In fact, the first floor sessions became surprising successes for the British Empire, gaining veto power at the League of Nations and territories in the Pacific and Middle East. Slowly, however, our luck sank down to a level equal to the rest of the conference, and we found ourselves in debate over policies and desires. For example, it was insisted that the British allow free seas off of the coast of African lands, and through strategic straits recently acquired. Under normal circumstances, no one would allow their territories to host foreign ships with absolutely no say in the matter; this frustrating event, which we wouldn't let stand, was one of many roadblocks which blocked negotiation and caused issues to fail completely. By the end of the day, every single delegation had been frustrated in some way, and the conference had devolved into bickering, shouting, and attempts to call others out of order. In particular, the French, who vetoed many attempts at compromise between other nations (or the entire rest of the conference), drew the ire of all delegations, and found themselves frustratingly blocked at every turn. The actual Versailles Conference most likely felt the self-propagating cycle of frustration to a higher degree, as we did not have the real weight of our respective nations, and a long negotiation process, upon us; the delegations, less willing to compromise, would absolutely refuse to support some bills, angering their supposed allies. In turn, they would find themselves backstabbed, and compelled to do the same again. This cycle, which we experienced during the Reparations session, is completely contrary to the efforts at compromising necessary for success.
(to be continued...)
(continued...)
Great Britain: There were a few main reasons that disarmament came out the way it did. The first was a a general lack of understanding as to what “disarmament” entails; a focus on sheer military manpower cause the overlooking of hardware, so that when questions were raised in the general floor sessions, their was no foundation to debate upon. As mentioned above, the conflicting interests of the delegations meant that every topic became an argument, and there was no baseline upon which one could say “Let's just leave it as it is.” The second dilemma was, again, the conflicting ideas upon which the delegations debated. The most difficult topic was that of who should disarm; no one, be it the Chinese or Japanese, the British or French, or any fledgling nation, wanted to reduce the size of its military in the aftermath of a brutal war, and with territorial (everywhere) and ideological (communism, imperialism, etc) conflicts clearly on the horizon. This topic thus took a considerable amount of time to address, and reduced the time allotted to other disarmament topics. Another proposition was that the German hardware be distributed to various allied nations. Besides completely going against the United States and their idea of universal disarmament, the questions of “to who?” and “how much?” proved impossible to compromise on, as everyone either had designs on the technology, or refused to allow rival nations to acquire it. These factors all caused division and conflict, and helped to make disarmament as vague as it ultimately was.
God Save the Queen.
To try and put yourself in another persons shoes almost 100 years later is not an easy task. Oftentimes our modern viewpoints and cultural values create a wall that prevents us from really understanding what it was like for someone in previous generations such as a delegate at the Versaille conference in 1919. However, I believe that the members of the mock versaille conference did a great job at putting their own beliefs aside and sticking to the viewpoints of their assigned delegate.
1.) Before the conference began, delegations made some alliances with each other. For example, the U.S. made alliances with Poland and the Arab Emirates. However, during the actual conference, the goals and ambitions of each nation got in the way of such partnerships. Since the U.S. was a major power, we tried to mediate the conference and make concessions to everyone. The smaller nations allied with us probably felt cheated on if they didn't get their full request. The Arab Emirates kept increasing their request for reperations which was not in the Americans interest. However, Britain did stay true to the Arab's when they presented a compromise to the reperations and keeping the Arab's one high. They mentioned the fact that they got them into the war and so they felt that they should compensate them in some ways. Overall though, the delegations often stuck to their own nations goals and beliefs and retained many nationalistic views. Any alliances that were made could be described as merely loose affiliations. This shows that the real peace process was most likely the same way, where each nation putting forth tough arguments consisting of their nationalistic endeavors. If we weren't under a time constraint then the mock conference could have lasted for days and that imitates the real conference in that it seemed to go on forever. The emotions of the delegates were probably very heated, even more so than they were in the mock conference since the delegates were actually from the various nations.
3.) At various times in the conference, I was ideed frustrated with how issues were being addressed and how some nations were acting. France gave many a real headache by taking advantage of their veto power and they weren't taking into consideration anyone else's wants and needs. I especially got annoyed with the Arab Emirates when they attacked the proposal to have the League of Nations mediate the waterways. That was the reason the League was created and having each nation control the water would just lead to more conflicts. Also, Yugoslavia was being very immature during the debate on reperations and even when they got what they wanted they still voted agains the bill. Overall, the all delegates were very self-centered and were not willing to compromise on anything, including my nation and myself. This is probably exactly how the real delegates felt in 1919. The nationalsim in the room was probably radiating much more than in our fake mock conference, and most likely producing a lot more heat in debates. After such a terrible war, each nation felt it deserved a lot in terms of reperations and input into the outcome of the treaty. No one was probably in the mood to compromise, creating a difficult and heated environment.
US- On the whole, we didn't really abandon our belief of self-determination. We had already secured that in the region of Shangdong and we had fought for it in Africa, even though there was no consensus on that issue. We felt that each country did deserve much needed reperations and it was calculated out to how much each nation should get. Each countries demands were around these ideal amounts too. However, not every nation agreed on how much everyone should get and some wanted a little more even though it was only a little more than what was already said. Most likely jealousy and pride got in the way of this debate and the U.S. tried to make everyone happy at the same time, which proved to be an impossible task.
The conference was not what I thought it would be. The atmosphere was much more hostile. Even though there was nothing to actually gain the aggravation created by the conference was clear. Though the delegation members were supposed to be allies they did not cooperate and often went after each other. Japan and China were battling over territory and power. Well France vetoed most of the amendments from passing. The animosity resulting from countries not getting what they want was clear. New enemies were created as France was deemed an competitor of many of the other nations. However we only represented the process therefore the actual conference when real territory and real money were at stake the animosity of the members of the conference would be many times greater. The supposed peace and equality that was suppose to be established would never occur and old feuds would only be exasperated. One of the most frustrating parts of the conference was reparations. The monetary values were uneven and any attempt to even out the reparations were vetoed by France who was already getting more money then many of the other countries who were left in equal devastation. In the end I found myself aggravated and can guess many of the other delegations felt equally irritated. Therefore I believe in the actual conference reparations would have been a point of disagreement as well. However in the actual conference with actual money the conflict of reparations would have been even more intense and may never have been resolved in a manner that all nations agreed with. As a Polish delegate I felt successful in my own endeavors and believe I achieved the greatest victory for my country. Being chair of territory dispute I gained vast amounts of territory nearly doubling the size of what the country actually was. However I believe our reparations committee failed horribly. The few millions we were to be given made no sense in comparison with the billions to be given to France and Great Briton. Even Italy managed to obtain more money than Poland. Many of the other committees were in between success and failure however the meager amount to be rewarded in reparations was unacceptable. Overall the conference was beneficent to the newly sovereign nation of Poland.
3. During the later stages of the conference, I believe that each and every delegate was frustrated in his or her own way. Each country had objectives to become successful, and during the process, every nation cannot get what they want. Therefore, I became very frustrated when no agreements could be made, especially during reparations. I became frustrated with other nations pushing for new proposals that were either irrational or not in the best interest of France. Every person became hard nosed and determined to get what he or she wanted. This caused tensions because people can’t come to a compromise. Representing France, we had a veto power that allowed us to reject any proposal that was not in our best interest. This broke ties with the smaller nations, and their actions of rebellion against our country became very frustrating because in the end it made everything seem impossible. I whole-heartedly believe that this is how the real participants of the Versailles Conference felt. Each delegate was only concerned about individual success and gain, which makes it so difficult to find a happy medium. Therefore, conclusions can’t be made, and not all of the nations can achieve their initial goals, permeating frustration through the delegates.
4. The most successful part of the conference was the distribution of the German territories. During the floor sessions of these topics, there were little to no arguments, and practically no new proposals. Each country was well represented, and each country agreed on the distribution. The only point of inquiry regarded Korea, but an almost unanimous decision proclaimed Korea sovereign. However, not all of the conference was successful. Reparations was a total disaster, especially for France. No agreement could be made and each country suffered. Countries voted out of spite, trying to get back at France for vetoing their proposals. In hindsight, as France, we should have strategically used the veto to achieve our objectives, but also keep our allies. In the end, this led to the disaster of reparations.
FRANCE- Going into the conference, we didn’t have a set plan for reparations. Our entire group felt that each nation would be against Germany, and would be willing to hand out proper reparations to each nation. However, we did not predict that the minor powers would want more money that initially planned. We thought that the smaller nations would recognize our huge casualties from the war, and designate us a large amount of reparation money. Also, we depended largely on the United States and Great Britain to vote with us after an agreement was made. The decision to abstain ultimately cost us the reparation money at the time, but our decision to prevent countries from getting an extra million dollars, a small amount when compared to billions, cost us votes and allies and ultimately reparations.
1. As a whole, I would say that they delegations did not function very well as allies. Even when broken down into committees, my allies were not listening to my proposals and were in fact completely disregarding half of what I had to say. I noticed that was also occurring between the other allied forces in our group, and you could tell that tensions were surfacing. Not to say that that was historically inaccurate, because I'm sure similar things had happened in the actual conference. In the actual peace process, I don't think allies could actually be trusted. All of the countries were pretty much in it only for themselves, they just gave themselves the title of an "allie" to make themselves look better.
3. I was very very very frustrated. As I said before, my own committee was not paying attention to what the United States proposed, and it annoyed me because I was following the 14 Points then trying to negotiate with the other countries, like France, who was our "allie". I do understand that the U.S wasn't exactly wanted, but the fact that we had a veto power and were a bigger power had to say something. Apparently it didn't. I feel like the real participants must have felt the same, only magnified by ten times because their conference was actually going to have an effect on people's lives.
US- During the conference everyone was getting a little testy since many of the smaller country's demands were not being met. I think we couldn't help but abandon our original beliefs of self-determination for some countries that we didn't really think needed help. As Anna said during the floor session, we were not there to give handouts to other nations such as Yugoslavia, just try to get them back on their feet.
2. Within this mock Versailles Conference, there were a few new conflicts created. First of all, everyone seemed to go against France because of their endless vetoes. Every time that there was a new issue raised, France was always the one to oppose whatever was at hand. The other two Great Powers were able to negotiate with the lesser nations and this helped to create alliances and no hard feelings like those with France. If only France had been able to come up with a resolution earlier on. If this had happened then they would have not been disliked by a majority of other countries. Towards the end of the conference, however, most of the smaller nations, such as Japan and Italy, went against the Great Powers in the vote on reparations. All of us smaller nations felt that we were being cheated out of millions of dollars (Italy, for example, lost $475 million), while the large nations still wanted to receive $5 billion. We felt that this was extremely unfair and most voted against the resolution. This in turn created a new conflict that put the large nations against the smaller ones.
3. I was a bit frustrated at some points during this conference, mostly at the Big Three nations. First off, France was not open to any negotiation and they were being very stubborn when it came to the time for voting. It was annoying that they vetoed every resolution and felt that they were doing nothing wrong. Another irritating aspect was how the Big Three nations wanted so much money while us smaller nations were going to be cheated out of millions. Even though the Great Powers have more power, smaller nations still lost a chunk of their population in the war. This should mean that we should receive as much as the Big Three. I believe that the real participants may have felt even more frustrated because this was real life for them, not a model of what actually happened. The small countries would have felt especially angry because they had very little influence in the matter due to the huge involvement of France, U.S., and Britain.
Italy-I feel that Italy should not be blamed for their past alliance with the Germans, because we changed our ways after we saw how poorly they were acting. We were able to amend our previous bad actions and come into the war with the Allies. We just had bad decisions, but we were able to make up for them when we fought the evils of Germany. Hence, we should not be blamed for being on the side of Germany before.
3. For the most part, I was not too frustrated. In my committees, everyone was orderly and took turns talking, which made it very productive because everyone was able to put forth their objectives. In the floor sessions, there weren’t too many problems. The biggest thing I would complain about is the fact that some of the proposals we wanted did not pass. Some of it, however, was internal disagreement in our group. I’m still not sure why, but some people focused on negligible facts. The most prevalent example of this was in the reparations floor session. We planned on getting upwards of four to five billion dollars, yet some people in our committee wouldn’t allow for Poland and the Arab Emirates to gain a few million dollars. In the end, this caused the final reparations bill to fail, which meant that no one was getting any money. I think that the real participants may have been frustrated, but for maybe other reasons. In our mock Versailles, we only had half a day to deliberate. In the actual Versailles Conference, there was much more time to think about any amendments. Although Britain didn’t feel it, I think most countries felt frustrated because they didn’t have the same power as Britain, France, and the US. Having veto power, we were able to assert our points more, and I could tell that some of the minor countries were frustrated with our opinions. This probably also happened in the actual Versailles conference.
4. As I mentioned above, I believe that the reparations discussions were the least successful in the conference. The three major powers were originally to get billions of dollars in reparations while the minor powers were to get only millions. When the Arab Emirates wanted three million dollars, all the major powers rejected the offer. I personally don’t know why, especially since we had an agreement with them, and they were only getting an increase that was less than 0.03% of what we were going to get. Other allies, such as China and Poland, also wanted only a few million more dollars, but were declined as well. Because we refused these increases, they did not allow the reparations bill to pass, which caused everyone to not get any money.
Great Britain:
In the disarmament committee, France and other allies wanted complete disarmament of Germany with no disarmament of the Allies. I anticipated this would be a problem because the Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for equal disarmament. To remedy this, we tried to push disarmament to the limits and only give Germany 50,000 troops and not allow them to have any heavy weapons like warships and airplanes. At the floor sessions, we and France expected the United States to mention the extremely unbalanced the disarmament. However, they did not complain about any of the numbers, so we went ahead and only restricted ground troops and confiscated all of German heavy equipment.
Country: Japan
3) I was kind of frustrated during the conference because of the lack of cooperation the nations had among themselves. I think that the most problems and frustrations came from the powers given only to the Big Three Countries, France, Great Britain and the Unites States of America. I think that veto powers given only to the Big Three created many situations where amendments as proposals could not get passed do to only one vote against it by a Big Three power, usually France. When a lesser country made an amendment that was beneficial to a number of countries but not to a Big Three, it was simply vetoed and then a proposal was issued by the vetoing nation that only benefitted themselves and was then voted down by the smaller nations. The excessive use of the veto by countries, especially the French delegation, led to delegations simply voting against the French, or other Big Three proposals out of spite. This led to very little being resolved in the floor sessions, or nothing at all, such as in reparations. I feel like in real life, delegates would be more willing to compromise to get some of what they want instead of none of it.
4) I think that the most successful thing the occurred in the conference came during the individual committee session. I think that in the smaller atmospheres more was able to be productively done and compromised on than in the floor sessions. During the committee, everyone had time to explain what their country wanted and listened to possible compromises. Once things got to the floor, more people tried to introduce their ideas into the proposals and led to further debates and more confusion and lack of unity. By far, the least successful part of the conference was the Reparations Floor Session. During the session, the Big Three powers fought with the smaller nations over every single penny, and even though they were getting 5 billion or more dollars, they would not agree to let the smaller nations, such as Serbia increase reparations by 6 million dollars. This lack of cooperation from the big three led to all the smaller nations voting down every proposal made by the larger ones, leading to no reparations for anyone. In reality, this would have caused the nations to collapse into economic turmoil and depression.
Japan). As a delegate from the Empire of Japan, I feel that as a country, Japan was slighted during the conference. I feel that we were not treated in a nature fitting of our stature as a nation. We were given a seat in the back of the room, behind even the Serbian delegation, which was not even yet a country. We received little if no support in proposals during the floor committee session and received very little acknowledgement in the League of Nations except for the Racial Equality Clause. In the pacific, the lands we seized from the Germans were taken back from us and given to the English and French. We received nothing from the war and left the conference feeling belittled and mocked.
1. How well did the delegations function as allies? What might this tell us about the real peace process?
The delegations worked as allies sporadically. The Arab Emirates seemed to promise every country their vote on every issue in return for self-determination in the Middle East, which made it seem as though some countries would not have received the Arab Emirates support. Alliances between the lesser powers hardly even mattered as much, because a veto from one of the big three (like France, for example) could sabotage all of their efforts. The most surprising show of teamwork was when all delegations except France unanimously joined together to support the formation of New Scotland. At no other time in the conference was there an issue supported with as much zeal by so many nations. This tells us that in the real conference, issues may have become more personal rather than focused on the good of their countries. In our conference, France was disliked because of their constant vetoing, and the lesser powers banded together on the reparations vote to ensure that, while they may not get their own reparations, France would not get theirs.
3. Were you frustrated? Why? How do you think real participants may have felt?
As the afternoon wore on, I could feel myself and most of the other delegates becoming more and more frustrated with each other. The morning went fairly smoothly, but the first speed bump was France’s veto of the Africa proposition. It had seemed that, after over half an hour of debating, every country was finally happy with the proposition. France was even getting what they asked for, yet they vetoed it anyway. After that, there was a prevailing anti-France sentiment, which led to what I think of as the Point of Order War. There was a period of about half an hour after lunch in which each country was yelling at each other country calling a Point of Order on some technicality not even specified and Robert’s Rules. At one point I had considered asking the Chair for a Point of Inquiry about whether or not we could get back to the real issues and stop with the useless name calling. I can only imagine how the real conference at Versailles was, seeing as we became frustrated after only several hours, and they were debating for just over a year.
Italy - I almost forgot about you! Now you know how Italy felt at the Conference. Should you be blamed for your previous alliance with Germany?
Italy certainly was forgotten at the Conference. In our Conference, for example, Italy asked for $500 million in reparations, which was written on the proposal. After some time of debating the proposal, the United States decided to rewrite it giving Italy a mere $25 million. The Big Three couldn’t seem to understand why all of the lesser powers vetoed the new proposition, but it was because some of the lesser powers seemed simply forgotten. Italy had literally 10 times as many deaths from WWI as the United States, but America seemed to demand more money simply because they were America. Italy should not be blamed for its previous alliance with Germany, because it fought on the side of the Allies in the war. When Italy realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary were in the wrong, it joined the Allies, as it should have. This fact should have been enough for the other countries in accepting the fact that Italy sacrificed much for them and deserved more benefits from the treaty.
1. I think alot of the countries lost sight of their allies. As one body, we did however rise together in certain cases, for example against france. Compared to real life it was obviously different. Yet, it was interesting to see how well we were able to work together in some cases. However some of the bigger powers took advantage of their veto power and in a way became selfish. A rise in nationalism made it so each country kind of became in it for themselves. The conference didn't exactly function as a mechanism of bringing anyone together. In real life the conference must have been hectic and very stressful. Rivalries were inevitable and so was further conflict.
4. Most successful was probably the Middle East and the creation of a new nation as well as resolving the territorial issues. Another success was in reparations where we worked as one to finally put the french down. Nobody ended up getting anything, however the economies of the greater powers would suffer far more then any other country.
Japan: As a delegate from Japan, i felt a great sense of disrespect from many countries. Sitting in the back of the room put us in solitude in a sense and alot of our ideas/resolutions were completely ignored. At the time, we were a great empire even though we didnt have a great amount of power compared to the big 3. With this and rocky relations with China, we continued with great disadvantages. This made it hard to work things out and even have our voices heard. We didnt ask for much in reparations and our opinions were shut out in war guilt which left us to be the only ones damaged during this. We were also stripped of Korea which was another loss. Overall it was very frustrating but then again, it was all a simulation. So no burdens should be held. Good job to everyone
Yugoslavia:
Yes I am very satisfied with the outcome and status at the conference. We as a country gain a lot from this conference. We had many great achievements, such as becoming a sovereign nation, gaining territory to our north, and helping to ensure that the Big powers did not gain any money in reparations. I believe our greatest victories were the annexing of land to the north, and becoming a sovereign nation. This was one of our biggest priorities going into the conference, this and reparations were basically all that we cared about and we gained the land and sovereignty with no argument. Our biggest loss was also a victory. We just like every other nation didn’t get any reparations, which would hurt us but not nearly as much as it will the Big powers.
2.) Yes many new conflicts were created during this. This happened mainly because the delegations forgot their allegiances to their allies and would just cause them to get angry to each other. For example Yugoslavia helped Great Britain keep ports and such in the Middle East, so you figure we help you, you help us, wrong, Great Britain went on to screw us over on reparations by vetoing a bill to help us so in turn we helped to completely hurt them at the final reparations.
3.) I wasn’t too frustrated during the conference, as a minor power we accomplished a lot of things. The only thing I was really frustrated about was the fact that some countries would veto things that would help them, or veto things only to propose virtually the very same amendment, and also the delegates took things to personally or brought in their personally beliefs, instead of what the countries goals were.
1) Going in to the Versailles conference many countries seemed to have strong alliances among each other, but as the peace conference commenced alliances started to fall apart. There were some different moments when one country turned on another. Great Britain turned on one country and was also stabbed in the back by another country. At one point both Japan and China were asking Great Britain to be on their side. They both believed that we would agree with them but we ended up agreeing with Chine, who was our stronger ally. Although the “alliance” with Japan was not true, Great Britain’s alliance with China remained strong. The same cannot be said for the alliance between Great Britain and France. Great Britain and France were allied throughout the conference until France turned on Great Britain and vetoed a proposal to allow Great Britain and the Arab Emirates to have war ships along one’s own territory on the Coast of Africa. Great Britain was extremely upset about this outcome because France was supposed to agree with us but got nervous because they thought that we would end up maintaining a monopoly. However, Great Britain and almost all of the other countries gave reasons why there would be no monopoly specifically, the reason was that the Arab Emirates would also have claim to allow warships in that territory. I think that as the conference went on it was hard for countries to remain allied with each other because everyone started to think about their own country. This could give us some insight on the real peace process. I would imagine that during the conference the delegates started to think about their own countries priorities and safety, much like we did, thus, ensuring that delegates would turn on each other. Also, when one country turned on a different country it would make them angry. I know that Great Britain was extremely angry with France and it was all we could focus on for a long amount of time. All we wanted to do was get back at France. Broken alliances during the real peace conference could have had similar consequences. This was a great exercise to help us understand what the real Versailles conference was like.
3) There were multiple times that I was frustrated during the conference. The first was, of course, when the French turned on Great Britain and outraged every delegate at the conference (but it was good that we got them back by trying to make them into New Scotland.) Another time was during the reparations floor session. No country was every going to be happy with the results and by that point we delegates of Great Britain could not agree among ourselves. People were arguing over sums of money that were as little as 5 million dollars compared to Great Britain’s 4 billion dollars. I was frustrated because it seemed to me that no one was going to be satisfied it ended with no one receiving any money at all. Being a part of this mock conference has given me some insight on how the real delegates felt. It must have been extremely frustrating for them as well but I suspect they were better at compromising than we were. There is also the fact that they were negotiating for all of Europe and they had to try and make compromises that would upset the least amount of people.
Great Britain led the disarmament committee and the plan ended up being extremely vague. I think that people did not completely understand the gravity of disarmament. There were disagreements over 50,000 troops, and Great Britain stepped up to point out the insignificance of 50,000 troops. Also, I think that is was vague simply because the other points were not specifically mentioned during the individual committee session. I think that everyone was just concerned about Germany and did not give too many specifics.
1. The big three delegations tended to function together as allies due to their veto power ability. The big three realized that it was important to gain each other’s support because without it no amendments would pass. We functioned relatively well for the most part and while rules were suspended, or via note passing, we were able to make secret agreements in our favors. I believe it is true that these secret alliances are a somewhat accurate portrayal of what may have occurred in the actual conference. This is so because if the big 5 didn’t all agree, no amendments would have been passed. Therefore some negotiations must have occurred because of the countries worries to ensure that their own needs be met. Perhaps during the actual peace process however, alliances and deals were gone about with more modesty, whereas in our conference they were all quite blatant which ended up spawning enemies.
3. I personally was extremely frustrated during the conference because I felt like my points during the debate were not being fully understood by the floor. I felt that in order for the floor to grasp what I was trying to say I’d have to keep restating it in different ways which was a waste of time. It was frustrating that everyone allowed Britain so much power, and did not connect the individual gains that they were receiving to see the greater picture. It was also very frustrating that people were only considering their own selfish ambitions and ignoring other proposals that didn’t directly benefit them; however my delegation is not an exception to this. I think real participants may have also felt the same way, frustrated in trying to convey their points and win others support.
As France reparations were most important to us, however we used our veto power too much and this caused the other nations to dislike us. When the time came for reparations we weren’t in much of a position to propose that we get receive more money, due to the fact that everyone disliked us and wouldn’t support this. Our strategy consisted of gaining the support of the other big 2 nations Britain and the US. Their support was most crucial because if we didn’t have their backing nothing would be able to pass. However we had made a deal with Britain in the end, though at the last minute they backed out. We should have been more prepared for this section of the conference, because we just assumed that all other nations (aside from the U.S.) would be in support of making Germany pay the appropriate amount of reparations that we proposed given our dramatic economic devastation. We also should have granted the smaller powers their few million that they requested as it was not much of a price, and the price of them teaming against the super powers in the end so that the amendment did not pass, was much greater.
1)I think that most of the alliances made were a bust, because in the end they really meant nothing. I think we were not able to completely understand that allies do not have to one hundred percent agree on everything and that they are more of a safety net of sorts. Also, all the nations were guided by greed. I felt like our alliance with China was the only one that stood to be true. I think this shows us that alliances did not always hold true because in reality all the countries were out for themselves and no one else.
3)I think it was quite obvious that I was frustrated. I was mainly frustrated that things said in committee had no power in the floor session—facts changed as well as reasons for reparations. I was also frustrated that countries could not look past one nay vote to vote for a reparation agreement. I think it must have been ten times worse for the real participants because real things were at stake. In real life, had an agreement on reparations not been met, economies would have been shattered.
Disarmament was extremely vague, with no specific limitations beyond a number of troops. Why were there no specific provisions addressing issues such as naval vessels, air forces, WMD, heavy weapons, etc.?
From not being present at the disarmament discussion, my best guess is that countries really did not know the power behind certain forces. Also, in my more generic research I came across troop numbers more than anything else. I feel like the committee members didn’t really have an idea on what certain manpower can do. From what I was told I think a major issue was who should be disarmed and that got in the way of further discussion.
Arab Emirates:
As a member of the Arab Emirates delegation, I felt that our efforts to gain an independent Arab state were very effective. We succeeded in our goal with a unanimous vote for it. Our greatest victory was gaining an independent state. Our worst loss was not getting any reparations. Although we lost out on about 1 million dollars’ worth of reparations, France, Great Britain, and the United States lost out on a much greater amount, which is really a victory in my mind.
1. The delegations were somewhat successful as allies, but in the end I believe it was more of an attempt to screw France. We largely supported Great Britain and Yugoslavia, seeing as Britain was the main ally in our area during the war. We gave them control of key land between the new Arab state and mainland Europe, and in return they supported our causes. Many allies were created as the conference began. Yugoslavia had many of the same goals as the Arab Emirates, so as the conference went on, we both ended up supporting each other on many amendments. Most of the alliances made beforehand went out the door. Italy was supposed to be our greatest ally, but we largely did not help each other. I also thought Japan and China would be largely opposed to each other, but they proved to be able to work together better than many other countries. I believe the alliances made in the real treaty were stronger than the ones made beforehand in our mock version, but I do believe that reliable allies were a scarcity in the real thing.
2. New conflicts were created largely between France and the rest of the participants. France vetoed almost everything that did not help them, causing the rest of the delegations to resent them. This can be clearly seen by our attempts to annex France to Britain (which would have happened had Mr. Kirby not filibustered), and force France to pay all the reparations of the war. France clearly did not gain any supporters among the smaller powers, and this is why we voted against the final reparation bill, effectively costing France billions of dollars, and the smaller powers a fraction of that. The entire conference also penalized France for every infraction they committed, making them extremely frustrated, and making all of us happy.
Yugoslavia-
2. New conflicts were definitely created as a result of this conference. Everyone wanted different things out of the conference, and they all needed to go through others to achieve their goals. And this tension was easily recognizable in the open floor sessions. The fact that each of the big three got veto power and used it frequently spurred some definite resentment against the major powers. As a smaller nation it felt like I had to please others just to get things accomplished in my own nation. These bitter feelings were also felt by other small countries. Another issue also stemmed from the seating arrangements of the nations. At that time Japan believed they were a major power and should have been sitting in the front along side the US, France, and Great Britain. However, they were pushed to the back with China and Poland, which they took as a metaphor for their unimportance according to the great powers. And this only created harsher feelings to the great powers.
3. I was very frustrated during the conference. For starters I didn’t think the format of the conference was all that great because it didn’t allow everyone who wanted to speak a chance to, and some weren’t able to defend their positions. It also didn’t warrant the complete truth. People could get away with falsifying facts, but if they then moved to close the discussion, there was no way to set the record straight. But the most frustrating aspect for me came during the reparations floor session. My country asked for a couple more million dollars, which is virtually nothing compared to the billions that France and Great Britain were receiving. And yet, Great Britain refused, despite the fact that they would still be getting all the money they want, and nothing we asked for was coming from them. I was really baffled that a major power like that would even bother going out of their way to stop such a small amount of money from being given to a developing country.
Nation Specific Question. I am very satisfied with the outcome and the status of my country at the end of the conference. Yugoslavia came out looking like a developing, yet promising nation. We were not pinned with any war guilt whatsoever. And we were also able to acquire a good amount of land from both Austria and Hungary, and territory was a main objective for us. I believe our biggest victory and worst defeat kind of go hand in hand. In reparations we asked for an increase of 8 then 3.5 million dollars, and both proposals were shot down for reasons I am still unclear of. And this was the case for several other small countries. I am most proud that we were able to form a coalition in the end to stand up to the great powers and for lack of better words “screw them over.” We all knew that they needed their reparations money much more than we did, and to prove that they cannot walk all over us, we collectively gained enough power to strip them of any money. But because of this we also walked away with nothing. However, that’s a small price to pay for being able to overtake the great powers.
1. During the committee sessions, the alliances formed before the conference was working well. The Unites States had an alliance with the Arab Emirates. The agreement was that the Arab Emirates would receive their sovereignty if they supported the United States. In the beginning of the conference, this alliance was working well, but after the Arab Emirates received their sovereignty, the United States delegation did not support the Emirates in their proposal to receive more reparations money. In the actual conferences, there were prior alliances in the nations that attended. United Kingdom and France wanted to receive the most reparations funding since they believed that the war effected their economy and military the most. Whereas Yugoslavia believed that their reparations amount should be increased since many of the battles occurred in their territory. In the real peace process this is most likely what had happened. Even though there were alliances established, the representatives of the nations always had their countries best interest in mind.
3. The main frustration during the conference was during the Reparations discussions. The Second Deal that was created by the United States delegation gave most of the countries their demands. In spite of this, the smaller nations (Yugoslavia, China, Japan, and Poland) formed a collation against the major powers (United States of America, France, and United Kingdom). After debating for half an hour on small details, the smaller nations must have become frustrated with the vetoing of their proposals to increase funding. Although by that time, most delegates were frustrated with France and their actions so the collation may have formed from that issue. The frustration that I had stemmed from the smaller nations doing a majority veto on the reparations proposal that agreed to their demands. Their only reason for vetoing the proposal was so that none of the major countries would receive any money.
Country Question:
Although the United States believes in self-determination, we did not want to freely give out reparation money to counties who did not deserve the sums many of them proposed. Several of the arguments for the increase in funds were that their land and territories were destroyed in the course of the war, but this argument cannot be uniquely justified. A majority of the nations participating in the war also had parts of their country destroyed; it was not just one nation that suffered as a result of the war. The reparations were divided up in respect to how much each nation contributed to the war efforts. I believe the delegates of the United States did not want to freely give reparation money to every nation that asked. There was also differing opinions within our delegation that delayed our official position on the reparations and other issues. However, the United States did not completely abandon the idea of self-determination during the conference; we supported the sovereignty of Korea and the Arab Emirates.
Yugoslavia-
2. New conflicts were definitely created as a result of this conference. Everyone wanted different things out of the conference, and they all needed to go through others to achieve their goals. And this tension was easily recognizable in the open floor sessions. The fact that each of the big three got veto power and used it frequently spurred some definite resentment against the major powers. As a smaller nation it felt like I had to please others just to get things accomplished in my own nation. These bitter feelings were also felt by other small countries. Another issue also stemmed from the seating arrangements of the nations. At that time Japan believed they were a major power and should have been sitting in the front along side the US, France, and Great Britain. However, they were pushed to the back with China and Poland, which they took as a metaphor for their unimportance according to the great powers. And this only created harsher feelings to the great powers.
3. I was very frustrated during the conference. For starters I didn’t think the format of the conference was all that great because it didn’t allow everyone who wanted to speak a chance to, and some weren’t able to defend their positions. It also didn’t warrant the complete truth. People could get away with falsifying facts, but if they then moved to close the discussion, there was no way to set the record straight. But the most frustrating aspect for me came during the reparations floor session. My country asked for a couple more million dollars, which is virtually nothing compared to the billions that France and Great Britain were receiving. And yet, Great Britain refused, despite the fact that they would still be getting all the money they want, and nothing we asked for was coming from them. I was really baffled that a major power like that would even bother going out of their way to stop such a small amount of money from being given to a developing country.
Nation Specific Question. I am very satisfied with the outcome and the status of my country at the end of the conference. Yugoslavia came out looking like a developing, yet promising nation. We were not pinned with any war guilt whatsoever. And we were also able to acquire a good amount of land from both Austria and Hungary, and territory was a main objective for us. I believe our biggest victory and worst defeat kind of go hand in hand. In reparations we asked for an increase of 8 then 3.5 million dollars, and both proposals were shot down for reasons I am still unclear of. And this was the case for several other small countries. I am most proud that we were able to form a coalition in the end to stand up to the great powers and for lack of better words “screw them over.” We all knew that they needed their reparations money much more than we did, and to prove that they cannot walk all over us, we collectively gained enough power to strip them of any money. But because of this we also walked away with nothing. However, that’s a small price to pay for being able to overtake the great powers.
Before the conference, it seemed as if everyone was all set to go. The delegates had a clear list of their goals and purpose as well as who their allies were (in reality everyone should have been allies with each other but obviously that was not the case). Although as the conference went on, delegates were splitting up and each doing things to their own accord. Allies had split up and goals had changed. For example, Japan was dead set on gaining as much from China as possible. Though as the conference continued, the two countries were not enemies as expected. In fact they even had a common goal, usurp France. With shaking alliances like this, it makes one wonder if this is what really happens. If connections with countries can be broken and built this easily. I expect that it is very easy. Even in real life, all it takes is a common enemy (FRANCE) for everyone else to come together. Coming into the conference all the countries should have been allies. Though within the first 15 minutes of the conference enemies were made as countries sought to seek their own affairs. This tells us that alliances are very delicate and can be broken easily. So in real life, delegates have to have some amount of loyalty to their allies if they want to be supported in the end. Towards the end of the conference I was frustrated to the point where I wanted to crush France’s placard. Though not just France, the other great powers also. It was evident throughout the whole conference that the major powers abused their veto powers and alienated many of the central powers. This is why nothing got done in the end when it was time for reparations. Everyone was so ticked off that they would rather destroy the major powers than help themselves. If the great powers had not abused their vetoing power something might have actually gotten done in reparations. At the time of the actual Versailles Conference, Japan was a large imperialistic nation. They had way more power and military status than any of the central powers and therefore should have been treated with the respect given to the Great Britain, France, and the States. So when the delegates of Japan walked in the room, this is what they were expecting. However reality fell far short of the expectations. Japan was treated as if they were a small nation state with no legitimate power that could threaten anybody. The country was not called upon as many times as the major powers and was therefore not heard as much. Disrespect was evident. Japan was a great power at the time and should have been acknowledged as one but it was not. Even in the smaller committees, only one of our many goals was achieved. In all, the conference did not go as expected. I think I speak for a lot of people when I say only a few goals of each nation were achieved. If nations were more cooperative with each other a lot more could have gotten done. However, none of the great powers were willing to listen to the central powers as they vetoed one reasonable amendment after another. Japan rules. France drools.
1)The delegations all in all did not function well as allies with other delegations; for example, the Arab Emirates, who formed an alliance with Italy even before the start of the Versailles Conference, proved to disagree with the views of the Italians on many issues, such as War Guilt and Reparations, to the point where the delegates representing the Arab Emirates started to blatantly vote against Italy's decisions. However, new alliances were also formed as the conference continued; the Arab Emirates soon realized that the British, which were formerly seen as enemies, actually benefited the Arabs more than before. Thus, backstabbing and lying occurred frequently during the conference in order to get accomplish the goals of each individual nation; this indicates that in the real Versailles Conference, alliances were not always respected, and betrayal was often.
3)In many instances, I was extremely frustrated in the views of the other delegates, as well as the outcomes of compromise. One instance that inevitably angered me was during the War Guilt committee. The Arab Emirates, the "nation" I represented, largely fought the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. However, when placing the guilt of the War, France delegates insisted on not vindicating the Ottoman Empire, and placing the bulk of the blame on Germany and the individual States of Austria and Hungary. To me, this was a huge slap in the face, for the Ottoman Empire, who killed many Arabs during the War, were not even given blame. This was one incident that extremely frustrated me during the conference. I can imagine that inevitably, the delegates during the real Versailles Conference also faced much frustration and had to compromise for their own interests.
Arab Emirates: Overall as a delegate from the Arab Emirates, I am extremely satisfied with the outcomes of the Versailles Conference. From the Versailles Conference, the Arab Emirates has now become its own, sovereign nation, independent from any foreign reproaches. We acquired a vast area of land, and share some land with the British Empire. Also, the Arab Emirates has complete control over the waterways in the Mediterranean and Black Seas that will ultimately prove to be very profitable for our new nation. However, the delegation from the Arab Emirates has also had to compromise our views; we asked for $7 million in reparations due to the fight against the Ottoman Empire, and other nations, namely the United States, did not think that we deserved the money though we clearly helped the Triple Entente win the war. In the end, no nation was able to get any reparations. Also, during the War Guilt Committee, the Ottoman Empire was vindicated from blame, though the Arabs fought this empire long and hard during the war. These were two great defeats of the Arab Emirates, but, compared to sovereignty, they were insignificant. An Arab state was formed, and our goals going into Versailles were all-in-all met.
1)The delegations all in all did not function well as allies with other delegations; for example, the Arab Emirates, who formed an alliance with Italy even before the start of the Versailles Conference, proved to disagree with the views of the Italians on many issues, such as War Guilt and Reparations, to the point where the delegates representing the Arab Emirates started to blatantly vote against Italy's decisions. However, new alliances were also formed as the conference continued; the Arab Emirates soon realized that the British, which were formerly seen as enemies, actually benefited the Arabs more than before. Thus, backstabbing and lying occurred frequently during the conference in order to get accomplish the goals of each individual nation; this indicates that in the real Versailles Conference, alliances were not always respected, and betrayal was often.
3)In many instances, I was extremely frustrated in the views of the other delegates, as well as the outcomes of compromise. One instance that inevitably angered me was during the War Guilt committee. The Arab Emirates, the "nation" I represented, largely fought the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. However, when placing the guilt of the War, France delegates insisted on not vindicating the Ottoman Empire, and placing the bulk of the blame on Germany and the individual States of Austria and Hungary. To me, this was a huge slap in the face, for the Ottoman Empire, who killed many Arabs during the War, were not even given blame. This was one incident that extremely frustrated me during the conference. I can imagine that inevitably, the delegates during the real Versailles Conference also faced much frustration and had to compromise for their own interests.
Arab Emirates: Overall as a delegate from the Arab Emirates, I am extremely satisfied with the outcomes of the Versailles Conference. From the Versailles Conference, the Arab Emirates has now become its own, sovereign nation, independent from any foreign reproaches. We acquired a vast area of land, and share some land with the British Empire. Also, the Arab Emirates has complete control over the waterways in the Mediterranean and Black Seas that will ultimately prove to be very profitable for our new nation. However, the delegation from the Arab Emirates has also had to compromise our views; we asked for $7 million in reparations due to the fight against the Ottoman Empire, and other nations, namely the United States, did not think that we deserved the money though we clearly helped the Triple Entente win the war. In the end, no nation was able to get any reparations. Also, during the War Guilt Committee, the Ottoman Empire was vindicated from blame, though the Arabs fought this empire long and hard during the war. These were two great defeats of the Arab Emirates, but, compared to sovereignty, they were insignificant. An Arab state was formed, and our goals going into Versailles were all-in-all met.
1. While the delegations might have been in alliances with other countries in the beginning of the conference, these relationships would soon be strained. Most of the trouble started when the territorial resolution part of the conference was started. While areas such as Africa and the Pacific (sad face) were settled pretty quickly, Europe and the Middle East proved to be more troublesome. The Great Powers and the Mother Fs (France) did not want to leave without a significant amount of territory and stimulus, and so many of the "alliances" were cover-ups. In reality, most of the countries only wanted to gain territory or money for themselves, and so these alliances were only made to benefit the main country. This shows that the actual peace conference must have been stressful and hectic in regards to the alliance system, and it was a sign of future conflicts.
3. I was frustrated for portions of the conference, as my nation's size and the set-up of the conference was irritating. Japan was a small country to begin with, and since they had little involvement in the actual conflict, none of the other countries wanted to listen to us. The actual system of the conference was frustrating for everyone. Having to wait for everyone to say what they had to say forced us to include everything that we wanted to say in one statement. It also caused tension, as each nation had to wait for its turn to talk. One nation also Felt it necessary to Frustrate the heck out of everyone else by reFusing every idea and resolution that was brought to the Floor (the capital Fs should give a hint). If this actually would happen at the conference, then I believe that the real nations would have been there for a longer period than we were. The frustration shown by each country was crucial when examining the causes of WWII.
As the Great Empire of Japan, I was continually irritated by the lack of intelligence shown by the more inferior nations. Our fantastic island nation was never given enough credit or recognition, and during the real conference this caused our nation to leave the meeting prematurely. Even though we contributed little to the actual conflict, we received next to nothing. Even Yugoslavia got more than us, and they were not even technically a country during WWI! The only thing that we got included was the Racial Equality Clause, and it was only a portion of what we wanted in the treaty. The position at the back of the room was also not beneficial, as we were constantly ignored or blatantly insulted due to this position. But they'll all see…
2. (Were new conflicts created? Why?). The answer to this question is yes. Conflicts arose during our mock Versailles conference that did not actually arise during the real conference, and that were not foreseen. Perhaps the most memorable of these conflicts was the anger of most of the represented countries towards France. This started with the bad outcome of a long, say about 15/20 min, debate on the issue of territories in Africa. After engaging in a debate on this issue for so long, the delegates had finally come up with a good compromise that was thought to satisfy everyone, and preceded to call for a vote on the issue. Everybody voted “YA” on the issue, except for France and its fancy veto power. The five-minute break following this vote was when all of the other countries unanimously decided to boycott France; we were angered that the bill did not pass due to one country’s vote, especially considering the fact that France did not really have much to do with the territories in Africa to begin with. My understanding of their reasoning behind their “NAY” vote was that they were unhappy with the role Great Britain was to play in the proposed bill. For the rest of the conference, every country voted against France whenever possible, including in the Reparations section, which caused the outcome to be that nobody received any money at all to pay for damages. This was a huge conflict that led to almost all of the problems that came thereafter.
3. (Were you frustrated? Why? How do you think the real participants felt?). I was frustrated. I was frustrated at the fact that all of the countries that voted “NAY” on the Reparations bill (including mine) did so with the sole purpose of getting back at France. Basically, we cut off our nose to spite our face. It frustrates me that our group, and many others, made this decision without consulting every member of the group and gaining a consensus first. But, what angers me the most about this is that many of the people who made the decision to vote against France even though they were hurting their own countries in the process, will write about how the outcome of Reparations disappointed them on this blog. I felt that my group floated away from working as a team as the conference went on and group leaders began passing notes and making plans without consulting their groups all to get revenge on one country. I was frustrated that, at first, all the groups were mad at France for doing things to spite the rest of us and not necessarily acting in their country’s best interests, but in the end, we all proved ourselves hypocrites because we did the exact same thing. Everyone was too concerned about what France would get in Reparations, that they did not even take the time to see that by punishing France we were punishing ourselves, and if we were able to get passed that, we would have been better off. We were not self-interested enough. As for how the real participants felt, I know that the boycott against France does not need to be considered in this part of the question because the real delegates who participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 were mature enough to realize that this kind of revenge would not have been worth it in the end and that the real country that needed to be punished was Germany. I am sure that many of the delegates felt pushed aside, or left out, even by their own delegations, especially those belonging to the “lesser victorious powers” as in China, Japan, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia. I am also certain that many of them would have been frustrated to debate on a topic for a lengthy amount of time, only to have it vetoed by one of the great powers in the end, as it is considerably frustrating to waste time. (See next blog response for questions specific to China)…
CHINA:
China’s key goals and objectives were to make sure that if we were to sign the bill for the League of Nations, it was to promise us a return of our sovereignty, and the internationalization of our railroads in order to improve our country’s system of trade. However, the aforementioned were details too specific to be covered in the short time we had to conduct this conference. Otherwise, our more general goals were to gain back lost territories (regain sovereignty from Japan), and halt Japanese expansion and imperialism. Japan was supposed to be our main enemy in this whole conference; however, they ended up being rather docile and non-combative. We actually gained back our sovereignty and some additional territories in the Pacific as well, without much of a fight. As far as I am concerned, China made out pretty well, with the exception of reparations, considering our position as a lesser power, and our problems with Japan. The worst outcomes for us were those of the League of Nations, which we voted against because of the issue of 1 vote per country versus vote by population, where we favored the latter due to our large population; and Reparations, which we screwed ourselves over in. We had the chance to gain $7 million in reparations, which was $1.5 million, more than we asked for, but since we were so unnecessarily concerned with France, we got nothing. Like I said, we cut off our nose to spite our face.
2) Certainly the greatest conflict created was that involving the French. When the French began to veto a bill that they had proposed, an alliance was formed between the lesser powers to punish them, resulting in an attempt to turn the state into New Scotland. Ultimately, I feel this issue arose from an abuse of power on behalf of the French, and a mindset in which they held themselves above the lesser powers. This, (un)fortunately, led to a vindication on behalf of the other nations. However, animosity continued to be fueled on both sides, for the French insisted upon further alienating themselves by an attempt to manipulate the rules of order to gain their favor, which culminated with further penalization. I also noticed that even when the French began to cool down, and oppose less the other nations, they were still patronized. A clear example: the attempt to make them pay for the entirety of reparations, though they had done little instigation during that session. Thus, a strong, and rather tenuous animosity flared up between France and the other nations, which endured form its onset.
3) I certainly felt frustrated at times, though I was in a slightly different position of frustration then others. The incessant need of me to patronize the other nations into quieting down, reminding them to address me, and to keep their placards sown until they were called on became frustrating over time. I imagine at the real conference, the participants knew the rules of order a bit better, thus eliminating some patronization by the chairman, although I imagine he too would have had difficulty keeping them quiet. It was difficult not being able to participate in my country's side of the debate, for I certainly would have had a bit to say on arms limitations in Germany and division of european territories. I also found myself dreading to call on certain countries, for I feared them attacking both my nation's interests and hindering the conference (hence, my hesitation in choosing speakers). I would imagine the real chairman would have attempted to favor his country in choice of speakers-although, he may have been more detached form the proceedings altogether.
Although I was not involved in the decision to veto the reparations bill, I can hazard a guess as to why my country chose to abandon it. In use of historical hindsight, the United States may have felt that they, as a nation, could provide enough financial support to certain nations after the war that reparations, as they stood, could be abandoned. This may also have been an action intended to stop the current stand on reparations as it stood, and then present a more fair distribution of money for debate, not knowing that time was running short. It is unfortunate, however, that the US chose to abandon this issue.
1. As allies, the delegations made quite awful allies. During the committee sessions we would seemingly have made agreements with other countries and come happily to terms only to be surprised with new requests and problems during the final debate over the proposal. Problems that we had never occurred would arise from nations that we had thought would have guaranteed their full support. Allies changed from topic to topic as well. A nation that had gone against us during the partition of the African lands supported our cause later on during reparations. But even ironed out deals with other nations sometimes failed as they would back out the last minute like Great Britain did during reparations that caused a the bill to fail. The ever-changing dynamic s between the countries within the conference reflected upon reality. There was much debate during the actually Versailles conference that led to many nations withdrawing in anger because the “Allied nations,” could not come to terms with each other. The constantly shifting problems and wants made the peace process not peaceful and compromising at all and more of a barely concealed fight. Making peace is definitely easier said than done.
2. New conflicts constantly arised left and right from session to session. Oftentimes, there was not enough time to even bring up problems or requests from specific nations. Delegates, out of frustration, would just call for an end to discussion that was immediately backed up by multiple other members. New conflicts arose especially during discussions where not every nation had been represented during the original committee sessions. The nations involved may have had an agreement but other nations with personal rivalries and concerns would object to the proposal. Nations would be worried about their own security or unequal partitions. Nationalism often came to play as countries would put their needs and wants ahead of everything else. France for example vetoed the partition of the African territory because we felt threatened by Great Britain’s increased control and influence given to them in that article as well as the article passed for the partition of the Middle East.
3. I was very very very frustrated, especially towards the end where everyone’s tensions were strung out and it personal feelings took over rational judgment. I think that this particular conference was especially frustrating for France. Yes, we had veto power and we used it often (perhaps more than what was wise)and that only encouraged hatred from other countries. Once France made one wrong move by being the only country to defy the African partition, all the hate was directed towards France. Even the delegation leader seemed to hold personal feelings of hatred for our country. No matter what we did, even if it was reasonable, everyone immediately pointed us out as the villains. For example in the session on Pacific Territory, France was the only on the Big Three to veto the grant to give Japan and China sole jurisdiction on how they would divide their armies. We went against this proposal because we felt it gave them too much power and would lead to huge powers in the Pacific, powers that we, as Europeans, would not want in Asia. We were only looking out for the rest of the European nations, something which those European nations failed to see as they immediately directed more anger at us. The singling out of France was unjust and was very frustrating. Here we were, allies in the world war, yet we were making enemies of one another. Real participants most likely felt the same if not more because for them, they had actual lands and money at stake.
4. I think the conference started off real well. All of the nations seemed really happy with what was established under the League of Nations. I had thought that there would be a lot more heated debate over such a big policy since in the actual treaty, many nations disagreed and basically disbanded the fundamental ideals behind NATO, but in our case the delegates were committed and accepting. That proposal went well. But as the day wore on and people became more fed up and tired, the effectiveness of the conference decreased. For France, the least successful part of the conference was the reparations. This is partly because it was the final discussion of the day and tensions were strung really high at this point, to the point where individual delegations were making pointed remarks to one another that were out of line. Too much personal feelings were playing a part in the decisions and requests here and people failed to consider the Big Picture. Nations were making requests for more money from Germany, who we have already completely dismantled and crippled with our previous legislations. They completely lost sight of the point of reparations and the point of the conference at this point. France actually became the reasonable nation that wanted to prevent another war (which wasn’t in character but someone had to do it) by not trying to completely cripple the German economy. The ultimate reason that reparations was the least successful was the fact that all of the Bigger Nations were unseated by a coalition of the minorities. The fact that we did not pass reparations and that France and the rest of the nations who had invested a lot in the war was not going to get any compensation and therefore dead was the ultimate sign of failure.
As one of the Big Three, we were pretty confident that we would be able to manhandle some form of reparation from the other nations. The only question was how much we could receive. Our plan was to ask for a large sum so that if it was rejected by other nations, we would compromise and come to the actual amount that we wanted originally. We also ceded a lot more territory and influence to Great Britain in hopes that we could gain more in reparations and that they would be willing to support us in that. What we had not imagined was that the small nations would be fueled with enough hatred to want to give up their own compensations in order to cripple us. It was completely against the purpose of the conference for them to have done that. We came close to starting our own war amongst ourselves over things that should have been compensate-able. Because we were one of the Big Three and we knew that we had the support of the other 2 nations within the Big Three (at least we had thought until Britain made a folly by vetoing what they had originally agreed to), we thought that we had enough to ensure reparations. We made some bad decisions in rejecting the initial requests of the other nations (although we eventually did give in in the amendment proposed by the United States) because that caused bad feelings that did not go away with any amount of compensation.
And this does not necessarily pertain to the question but I think that France was unfairly singled out during the conference. Multiple times we tried to explain ourselves and formally apologize but that was only superceded by angry calls from the other nations for the delegation leader to hand out a suspension which was handed out without fail each time. Had people been more reasonable and behaved like actual delegates, we would have been guaranteed reparations. The random whims of the other nations that we were subjected to were the main reasons that we failed in reparations.
1. Before the conference, many nations allied with others to pursue their own interests. For example, Italy promised to support other nations' interests as long as it received parts of Austria and got a fair amount of the reparations. Other Lesser Powers such as Japan and the United Arab Emirates did the same. During the conference, most of these alliances were kept, but the Great Powers placed their own interests above these alliances. Sometimes, it was difficult for a Lesser Power to get a proposal through even with the support of a Great Power. The mock Versailles Conference shows that during the peace process there were probably much more complex agreements between nations. In the mock Versailles Conference, nations were apathetic towards issues that didn't affect their nation, such as China and Japan with European and African territories and Italy with Pacific territories. In the real Versailles Conference, each nation had a greater stake in the outcome so many strategic alliances were made.
3. As a delegate from Italy, I was not frustrated because our nation accomplished its historic goals. However, other delegates were frustrated because the Great Powers' veto power made it very difficult for proposals to be accepted. There was no mechanism to override a veto, so any proposal that was not in the interest of one of the Great Powers could not be passed. An example of this was seen in the African territories and reparations sessions. The exclusive veto power given to the Great Powers severely hampered the progress of the Versailles Conference. The real participants probably felt more frustrated because they had a much greater stake in the outcome and it was so difficult to reach a consensus with all three Great Powers.
Italy: We should not be blamed for our previous alliance with Germany because we did not support Germany or Austria Hungary in the war. Even though the Treaty of London was a secret alliance, we should be treated with more respect because we made significant contributions to the Allied war effort. We opened up a new front for the war and lost a large number of men. We should not be given less compensation for our involvement in the war on the basis of our previous alliance with Germany.
1) The delegations did not function very well as allies. Other than a few groups of two or perhaps three nations that united over a topic, there was little net unity between two delegations. What made matters worse was the veto power given the United States, France and Britain. Even after the question of territories in Africa was settled rather easily, France vetoed it. This in turn caused most of the nations in the conference to turn against France, which then led to France attempting to veto almost every amendment that was proposed. As a delegate of Italy, I found myself at odds with different nations in each of the committees, and was forced to switch alliances each time accordingly. I witnessed delegates from other nations forging, breaking, and re-forging temporary alliances in a similar manner. The failure of delegates to cooperate tells me that in the real conference, competing national interests must have led many disagreements, and several nations must have been angry over the final treaty. The Italian delegation, for example, left the conference in anger before the final treaty was signed. If classmates and friends can’t even come to an easy agreement in a school setting, I can imagine how difficult it must have been for national delegates.
4) Personally, I felt that the most successful part of the conference was the banding of five lesser nations to stop reparations from passing after the three great powers had approved it. The lesser nations were unhappy with the small reparations they were given and the enormous sums that the big three were receiving. In a day where there was very little agreement between nations, this was a surprising outlier. (Looking at it from the other side, the inability of the nations to agree on a war reparations section of the treaty can be seen as a failure). There was also a fair amount of agreement over Territories in Africa, but the motion was unfortunately vetoed by France. Surprisingly, the nations had a difficult time agreeing over territories in the Middle East. It wasn’t even the land that was the problem, but the waterways. I’m not really sure why this happened. Another area that held an unexpected amount of disagreements was war guilt.
Question About Italy:
Italy should not be blamed for its previous alliance with Germany. The pre-war period was marked by an increase in distrust and competition amongst the powerful nations in Europe. This was reflected both in an increase in Imperialism and a second industrial revolution that propelled nations, like Germany, who had previously been lagging behind to the top. As distrust between nations grew, there was also a shocking arms race, and countries began massing armies larger than ever before. The pre-war alliances that were created during this time showed the desire of the nations to create a more stable and secure world. For example, Britain felt so unsecure that they ended up in an alliance with France, a country that had historically been a great rival. Given the conditions of the time, it is no surprise that Italy, a nation that had just come into being, sought the protection of greater powers. Between the two major groups of allies that were developing, Germany offered Italy an alliance first, and for the sake of safety Italy ended up allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary. For this Italy cannot be blamed. Furthermore, when Austria-Hungary and Germany first entered the war against Russia, Italy had yet to be involved. As Italy took no real action against the allied forces, other than having an alliance Germany, they cannot be blamed. Italy entered the war after the Treaty of London. This treaty offered Italy land in return for entering the war on the side of France, Britain, and Russia. The Treaty was signed by all four of the mentioned nations, and thus no one can deny that Italy had completely switched sides and aligned itself with Triple Entente. No one can deny Italy’s efforts in the war either. Italy gave 650,000 men for the war, and they were fourth behind Russia, France, and Britain for number of troops lost. Clearly, Italy had committed itself to the cause of the Entente. It is true that Italy had limited military success, which the other nations in the Entente weren’t thrilled about, but this has nothing to do with Italy’s alignment, and they should not be questioned simply for failures in the war.
1) Most of the delegations didn't function as allies. I was a delegate from the Arab Emirates, and going into the conference we were planning to ally ourselves with Italy and the United States. We soon formed a stronger alliance with Britain, however. Alliances between other countries seemed strained as well. It was all about personal gain. The only time a strong alliance was formed among the delegations was when we attempted to annex France and rename it New Scotland. Alliances in the real Versailles conference were likely no better than ours.
3) Throughout the course of the conference, I encountered many issues that frustrated me. A major one was the territorial resolution for Africa. It was a good proposal, but France decided to veto it, despite the fact that they supposedly agreed with it. This incident was what led to the nations banding together against France. Another source of frustration was reparations. The other nations only wanted to give the Arab Emirates 1 million dollars! We eventually reached an agreement of 4 million dollars, but that was still only a fraction of what other nations were being awarded. Then, when it was time to vote on the issue, the smaller nations voted 'nay' on the issue simply to spite the Great Powers (FRANCE). As the only small nation that didn't support that move, I say it was really very childish. Did the other delegations not understand the economic repercussions of not allowing a reparations deal to be made? Also, while the veto power of the Great Powers makes sense on paper, in practice they just abused their power and vetoed good proposals (Especially a certain country that rhymes with 'Prance'). I believe that delegates in the real Versailles conference must have just as, if not more, frustrated, especially if the Great Powers used their veto power like they did in our conference.
Arab Emirates: At the start of the conference we were not even a real nation. By the end we had gained an autonomous Arab state and shared control of the Red Sea. We were very satisfied with the outcome of the conference. Our biggest victory was gaining the right to an independent state. That was one of a very few, if not the only, proposal that was voted for unanimously. Our worst defeat was not being given reparations. We were the only small country not to vote against the proposed reparations because we recognized the stupidity of that move. Even that wasn't that big of a defeat as we were only being granted about a million dollars. We also would have liked to blame the Ottoman Empire for the war because if it weren't for them (and Britain) we wouldn't have even been involved in the war. Overall, our delegation was very happy with the outcome of the conference. While we didn't accomplish everything we wanted to, we did get what we wanted most: an autonomous Arab state.
1. The delegations did not function well as allies. Though there was the occasional successful motion by a few different countries that succeeded, such as the effort by the lesser powers to deny the Big 3 reparations, generally the delegations looked after their interests exclusively. Domestic concerns always took priority over alliances. Also, it a relationship with another country was strained at any point in time, due to a disagreement of any kind, it would be ruined for the rest of the conference, as all of the delegations were prone to holding grudges.
3. I was extremely frustrated throughout the process. First of all, the process of discussing proposals and getting them to pass was a very inefficient and time consuming process. The process of first making a proposal, and then discussing the proposal, and then amending the proposal, and then voting to close debate on a proposal, and then voting on the proposal, was one that I found extremely lengthy and unnecessary. I was even more frustrated when after this long process, a proposal would not pass due to one single nation's vote. I could not imagine how frustrated the real participants must have been during the real Versailles conference that lasted over a year. Our conference was only one day long, and I was frustrated with the process; a year long conference that undoubtably had more formalities than we had to follow would have been incredibly frustrating.
Country: Italy
No, Italy should not be blamed for their previous allegience with Germany. Though they did previously have a defencive treaty with Germany, that is not the side that they fought on during the war. Italy suffered over 2.2 million casualties in the war, many times more than the United States 300,000. With such a large sacrifice made by the Italian people, their previous allegiances should not have even been a factor at Versailles.
3. Now that this conference is over, I can honestly say that I was quite frustrated by the workings within it. I felt that there was way too much arguing and fighting among countries as opposed to working together and compromising. One example that I though was really bad in terms of arguing over something stupid was the fight over reparations. Being from Yugoslavia this really ground my gears because the US wouldn’t give 8 million dollars extra to a country that was torn apart by the war while they were getting some significant amount more even though the fighting didn’t happen on their soil. Plus we weren’t even using real money, not even like monopoly money or something we were arguing over the thought of giving 8 million dollars to a war torn country. For this reason I find it amazing that the delegates of the real conference could get anything done at all. If we were wasting time arguing about imaginary money, think of how frustrated the actual delegates would have been while dealing with real money.
2. The most successful aspect of the conference was the fact that that no one got hurt during the conference. I swear someone was going to get totally angry at something and go crazy. I think that if I had to repeat the conference for a few more days I would have gone insane. The fact that absolutely no reparations were passed at the end of the day showed our lack of patients nearing the end of the day. It was a huge failure because no country was able to get anything to rebuild. I'm not sure what else to say to this question because reparations was the main reason for having the conference and without settling anything in this sense, it defeated the purpose of having a conference
I am not satisfied with the outcome of the conference as Yugoslavia was given no money to start to rebuild what part of our nation we had at the beginning of the war. Our main goal going into the conference was to get some money to help fix our war torn country and we ended up with nothing to help ourselves out. Our biggest victory therefore I would say was not being blamed for the Serbian nationalist that assassinated Sir Ferdinand which possibly may have started the war. It’s not much but at least we came out spot free of guilt so maybe we will be thought of a bit better in the future. And like I said our worst defeat was getting no money to help out our country recover from the war.
As Poland, I was actually fairly satisfied with our delegation’s work throughout the conference. We managed to gain a lot of the territory we had been hoping to have access to, including the territory like Galatia we didn’t think we would be able to get. That was probably our greatest success. We didn’t really overtly offend anyone besides France, and basically everyone overtly offended France. We also stayed on relatively good terms with both China and Japan, a difficult task in itself. As for other committees, Germany’s arms reduction is at least good for us because it will help guarantee us a safer future. I would have preferred a stricter disarm to make our future more certain, but too firm a stance would have angered other powers. So we did get probably the best result we could have while remaining in everyone’s graces. I think our biggest failure was in Reparations, as we didn’t get a lot of money in the treaty and got none at all by refusing to pass it. It would have really helped out our economy, but it was in order to maintain relations with smaller countries, and I don’t think anyone was particularly pleasant and willing to acquiesce with the larger powers. Still, at least the conference was ‘postponed’ and not cancelled.
Delegates did not function too well as allies. There was surprisingly heated opposition coming from the powers when all of them were supposedly on the same side. People were almost always in disagreement over small and insignificant details, and everything had to be torn apart and nitpicked before being passed. Ultimately, I think this supports the viewpoint that the road to peace was not an easy one and in fact was long and laborious for the members of the conference to compromise (which they most likely did not.)
I was extremely frustrated, because I felt like as Poland, nobody really listened to us. Our points were oftentimes largely ignored, or even if they got consideration, a veto from the big three could easily shut us down. Regardless of how the plan could truly help a lot of smaller nations or a lot of people in the long run, if one of the big three snootily turned their noses up at it, it was shelved completely. I felt like the conference wasn’t fair in that respect, and that the treaty was largely slanted towards what the Big Three wanted or believed. I’m sure the participants must have been even more frustrated, because there was so much more to lose. If we got a veto on something, we were angry that it happened, but we weren’t as furious as we could have been because ultimately we didn’t have stake in the outcome. I feel like during history, participants would have been even more riled up, because they had to watch their possibilities and dreams slipping agonizingly through their fingers by veto after veto, and their country truly could have suffered for it.
Jacob Jones
France
1.) In our conference the delegations really did not function well due to the fact that each country was after its own personal gain and really did not care about the other countries. France for instance, vetoed all of what did not help the French government obtain their reparations and what would affect the French government in the end. However, when France had no say when we were being “punished” the smaller powers did quickly ally to try and get back at France. Also many delegations may have had some similar goals and to achieve those goals they would team up, but as soon as they were at a disagreement all the compromise between the two nations stopped and then went their individual ways to help their country. In the real peace process I feel that many of the real delegations would do as we did and put our country before any other and try to obtain their own objectives.
3.) Throughout the conference, I was definitely getting frustrated due to many of the countries trying to gang up on us and see our demise. For example, Yugoslavia looked for any minute infraction of the rules to try to call our country out of order and take advantage of us. Also when it came to the reparations and we ended up not getting any money because some countries voted it down I was really frustrated because in the deal that we had struck Poland and Yugoslavia ended up getting what they wanted and still they voted nay against the bill. I just had no idea why they voted no so France ended up getting no reparations, which we direly needed. I think the real participants got frustrated too because they sometimes couldn’t get what they wanted for their country and if one decision was made that other countries didn’t like then the other countries would try and get back at them out of spite.
France’s Question:
Our strategy to ensure reparations was to get the other two countries of the big three on our side and a few minor countries so that the bill would pass. To get the US on our side France was going to side with them on the League of Nations and support what the US wanted in it so we could use that to our advantage and hopefully have them agree to our terms on reparations. What was really unexpected was to have Britain back out of our deal with them because we each were getting 5 billion dollars which is what they wanted and also many of the minor powers voted nay which was unexpected seeing that Poland and Yugoslavia were getting what they wanted and still they voted nay. We should have persuaded the minor countries some more while we had the chance in some of the other committees so that they would back us in our attempt to get what we wanted in reparations.
2) The Versailles Conference gave rise to a multitude of new conflicts. Going into the conference, all of the nations were allies, untied against a common enemy, Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the Versailles Conference however, this unifying factor was not present. Instead, each nation's personal interests moved to the top of their agenda. Since the countries varied in numerous ways such as size and overall power, nations often had opposing desires. If one nation wanted something, there would often be a nation who would do anything to prevent them from achieving it. For example, the US, in the interest of self determination, wanted to give independence to all the territory in the Middle East. Great Britain and France, as imperial powers, wanted to maintain their influence in the area.
3) In general, this conference frustrated me and I believe that my peers have also felt this way at some point. This frustration is rooted to each nation's opposing views. Not one country was able to completely fulfill each and every single one of its objectives. For example the US could not fulfill all of its fourteen points. The US wanted to free all the land in the Middle East. However Britain and France wanted to maintain influence, so a compromise was made freeing some nations, but still giving Britain and France control. In addition, progress was difficult to make. This was due in part to veto powers. France used its veto power often and was often the sole opponent of a certain proposition. This frustrated all nations, to the point that all turned against France and supported France's annexation into New Scotland. In the case of reparations, no prgoress was even made. A proposal was made giving each country the monetary amount they asked for, yet it was somehow rejected. If this process was frustrating for us, then it must have been tenfold for the real participants. Towards the end of the conference, after six hours, all of us were exhausted and willing just to end it regardless of the outcome, since we already fulfilled our grade requirement. On the other hand, the real participants were in the conference for months, playing for real, tangible rewards.
Nation Specific Question: US
I believe that the US did not abandon its core beliefs in national self determination, but merely moved away from it a bit in the name of progress. The great powers, Britain and France, wanted to maintain their colonies. This was their primary goal going into the conference. It was obvious that they would not support the idea of self determination. Therefore, in the name of compromise, the US conceded a bit to Britain and France. Since we could not completely free these lands, we sought to minimize the extent of the great powers' influence and fulfill self determination to its greatest extent. For example in the Middle East, Britain's primary goal was to maintain the Bosphorus and Dardonelle. The US allowed this but gave the Arab Emirates freedom and created a shared region in the Red Sea. This course of action was necessary in order for the conference to progress.
1. By and large, the delegations functioned quite horribly as allies. As each individual nation's goals were their only worries, it would have made sense to come together for support, and subsequent assured success. The predominant methodology in practice, however, seemed to be ensuring all nations other than your own got as little as possible. Especially in the reparations discussion, small numbers were debated endlessly as the great powers (the US in specific) were unwilling to budge. There are two instances, however, where alliances seemed successful (or, at least, attempted to work for mutual success.) My caveat is included because the alliance of which I speak is that of my Italian delegation and that of Japan. We had agreed previously to assist each other, as none of our interests conflicted. Due to personal relationships (friends), we kept strongly to this alliance and attempted to argue in their favor. Stated blatantly, however, they got screwed. A lot. It seemed every instance in which the stood to gain, they received nothing. Whenever an opportunity to cut them out of a deal was present, it seems that chance was taken. This was fairly surprising, as their lead delegate seemed quite successful in presenting his ideals and won the admiration of the general crowd. The second alliance was the loose-yet-enthusiastic one formed in the hopes of annexing New Scotland. This arose out of a general displeasure for France's veto's, and perhaps a bit of adolescent mischief. While the prospect was present, everyone was ready and willing to work together. When the common goal disappeared, however, the alliance fell apart and quit working together on other issues. This is perhaps indicative of the way common enemies motivate in real life- once the enemy is gone, so is the reason for unification.
3. My only frustration over the conference was the disregard for logic by the crowd when it seemed nobody was paying attention to what was going on. The pattern of speaking often left people focusing off topic on what was last said, even if a previous delegation had made a crucial point or request. In the reparations discussion, Italy's offered payment was reduced from $500 million to $25 million, seemingly without any reason or consideration. Our objection was quickly swallowed by the bickering of the smaller nations, and when it came time to vote, we turned the treaty down. (And it required only one more vote to pass.) The gap in logic also occurred in one instance where a group proposed their amendment, proposed to close the discussion, and proposed to vote on the amendment, all in the same turn of speaking. This was one of the instances where Japan was cut a horrible deal, and as such the breaking of the rule caused a crucial loss. It is likely the real participants knew better what was and was not important, and did not 'forget' the rules of conduct midway. As such, it is likely they did not experience the same frustrations as myself. They, however, had to deal with the knowledge that their decisions actually affected their nations. As such, I could imagine the delegates becoming extremely frustrated when they suffered a loss or bad deal.
Part 2:
Italy: Italy should suffer very little blame for its alliance with Germany, if any at all. The alliance itself was not very strong, as highlighted by the fact that Italy fought against Germany and Austria later in the war, and never fought for them. The alliance itself even was the product of a world-wide mentality regarding strength and weaknesses. Countries at the time believed they needed alliances to be strong. If they had no allies, they were weak and could be invaded. The creation of the League of Nations was in one way a direct response to this tendency. The belief went, if nations did not feel they needed many intertwining alliances, war could not break out at the drop of a hat, as it had for World War I. As the first world war also had no real moral backdrop, Italy could never really be 'blamed' for creating a friendly partnership with any country. Though the losers of war are typically painted black as the 'bad guys,' the real moral grounds were much less clear. Germany was not a 'bad' country, and as such, Italy had no real reason to turn down their offer of friendship.
Part 1:
1. By and large, the delegations functioned quite horribly as allies. As each individual nation's goals were their only worries, it would have made sense to come together for support, and subsequent assured success. The predominant methodology in practice, however, seemed to be ensuring all nations other than your own got as little as possible. Especially in the reparations discussion, small numbers were debated endlessly as the great powers (the US in specific) were unwilling to budge. There are two instances, however, where alliances seemed successful (or, at least, attempted to work for mutual success.) My caveat is included because the alliance of which I speak is that of my Italian delegation and that of Japan. We had agreed previously to assist each other, as none of our interests conflicted. Due to personal relationships (friends), we kept strongly to this alliance and attempted to argue in their favor. Stated blatantly, however, they got screwed. A lot. It seemed every instance in which the stood to gain, they received nothing. Whenever an opportunity to cut them out of a deal was present, it seems that chance was taken. This was fairly surprising, as their lead delegate seemed quite successful in presenting his ideals and won the admiration of the general crowd. The second alliance was the loose-yet-enthusiastic one formed in the hopes of annexing New Scotland. This arose out of a general displeasure for France's veto's, and perhaps a bit of adolescent mischief. While the prospect was present, everyone was ready and willing to work together. When the common goal disappeared, however, the alliance fell apart and quit working together on other issues. This is perhaps indicative of the way common enemies motivate in real life- once the enemy is gone, so is the reason for unification.
3. My only frustration over the conference was the disregard for logic by the crowd when it seemed nobody was paying attention to what was going on. The pattern of speaking often left people focusing off topic on what was last said, even if a previous delegation had made a crucial point or request. In the reparations discussion, Italy's offered payment was reduced from $500 million to $25 million, seemingly without any reason or consideration. Our objection was quickly swallowed by the bickering of the smaller nations, and when it came time to vote, we turned the treaty down. (And it required only one more vote to pass.) The gap in logic also occurred in one instance where a group proposed their amendment, proposed to close the discussion, and proposed to vote on the amendment, all in the same turn of speaking. This was one of the instances where Japan was cut a horrible deal, and as such the breaking of the rule caused a crucial loss. It is likely the real participants knew better what was and was not important, and did not 'forget' the rules of conduct midway. As such, it is likely they did not experience the same frustrations as myself. They, however, had to deal with the knowledge that their decisions actually affected their nations. As such, I could imagine the delegates becoming extremely frustrated when they suffered a loss or bad deal.
First half
1. How well did the delegations function as allies? What might this tell us about the real peace process?
The delegations made awful allies. Simple agreements between friends and classmates, such as ones Italy made with the United States and the Arab Emirates prior to the treaty, were completely disregarded during the treaty. In some cases, it was just inconvenient to help the other countries. I was working in the Reparations Committee, and although I was aware of our previous agreements, I was only focused on getting as much money for Italy as possible in the initial resolution. I did not actively obstruct their proposals, but I did not actively help them either. This tells us a lot about the real peace process because we are all classmates from the same school, who speak the same language and have the same customs. We are also friends with the other delegates and have no conflicts between us as severe as the ones between the smaller countries and the Big Three. Despite all that, we could not adhere to our agreements with our allies. If we neglected allies to that degree, then in the actual Treaty of Versailles, between people of different countries who have different backgrounds and motivations, alliances must have been neglected.
4. What was most successful about the conference? Least?
The most successful thing about the conference was getting the delegates to be passionate about their causes. At many times, students were arguing heatedly for their country, although they had no true reason to feel so devoted to their country. For example, Poland and Yugoslavia both pursued more money from reparations and made their cases with facts and pathos. Additionally, everyone participated at least once, and, though there were a few times when the debate lagged, the overall peace process was filled with eager discussion. The least successful thing about the conference, however, was staying on task with the actual resolutions. Everyone took the conference at a different degree of seriousness, and sometimes the more frivolous ideas interrupted the peace process, such as the idea to annex France. Although it arose because France’s constant vetoing of all the amendments, including ones they had contributed to, such as Italy’s amendment for African Territories, was frustrating the other countries, it was still a stretch from the contents of the real peace process. Furthermore, when the United States began proposing a Reparations Amendment during France’s 6 minutes, the delegate was mostly ignored only because everyone was focused on annexing France. Lastly, the agreement between the little countries to veto the Reparations resolution came from the mindset that it would be okay to get nothing as long as the Big Three get nothing, but, in actuality, many countries were in severe debt from the war and could not have possibly rejected getting money from the defeated Central Powers.
Part 2: Italy - I almost forgot about you! Now you know how Italy felt at the Conference. Should you be blamed for your previous alliance with Germany?
Italy was mostly forgotten in our mock Conference, as most of our amendments failed to pass and our claims were reparations were disregarded by the Big Three. However, those actions are not justified because Italy should not be blamed for its previous alliance with Germany. They were allies before the war started, when all the European countries wanted alliances with others for protection. Furthermore, they never fought for Germany and stayed out of the war until switching sides in the Treaty of 1915. Italy fought against the Germans and Austrians and had a casualty rate of 39%. There is no reason to blame Italy for anything.
Great Britain Question:
Disarmament appeared to be an ambiguous issue during the floor session due to both the initial proposal created by the committee, and the general knowledge of a reasonable military force for each country involved. Not a member myself of the disarmament committee, I was not involved with the creation of the proposal, however I can understand how the situation that occurred transpired. Ultimately, I believe the lack of knowledge and mutual certainty on any section of disarmament lead to the creation of a bill with very loose guidelines.
1. As one would predict with any process concerning international delegation, no issue was completely straightforward, and many, if not all, countries were lead by a private agenda. Although alliances and agreements were made, these seemed to mostly be upheld during the committee sessions, and dissolved when the issue faced the floor. Countries realized quickly that certain topics had not been thoroughly thought through prior to the conference, and some previously-made agreements were necessary to ignore. This resolved to create a very tense and argumentative platform from which to debate the topics presented.
3. Frustration was present at every table , in one shape or another, manifested as a response to betrayals, backstabbing, and greediness. I believe that almost no one was able to enter the conference and get exactly what they wanted without difficulty, and often times, it seemed like it was the primary objective to do the exact opposite. For whatever reason, whether it be to spite another country, or push an unrealistic policy, decisions were made and actions were took that left many people annoyed and truly frustrated with the whole process.
Great Britain Question:
Disarmament appeared to be an ambiguous issue during the floor session due to both the initial proposal created by the committee, and the general knowledge of a reasonable military force for each country involved. Not a member myself of the disarmament committee, I was not involved with the creation of the proposal, however I can understand how the situation that occurred transpired. Ultimately, I believe the lack of knowledge and mutual certainty on any section of disarmament lead to the creation of a bill with very loose guidelines.
1. As one would predict with any process concerning international delegation, no issue was completely straightforward, and many, if not all, countries were lead by a private agenda. Although alliances and agreements were made, these seemed to mostly be upheld during the committee sessions, and dissolved when the issue faced the floor. Countries realized quickly that certain topics had not been thoroughly thought through prior to the conference, and some previously-made agreements were necessary to ignore. This resolved to create a very tense and argumentative platform from which to debate the topics presented.
3. Frustration was present at every table , in one shape or another, manifested as a response to betrayals, backstabbing, and greediness. I believe that almost no one was able to enter the conference and get exactly what they wanted without difficulty, and often times, it seemed like it was the primary objective to do the exact opposite. For whatever reason, whether it be to spite another country, or push an unrealistic policy, decisions were made and actions were took that left many people annoyed and truly frustrated with the whole process.
(3) Based on what my country, Italy, was able to accomplish during the conferences, I was not frustrated in the slightest. We were able to gain most territories we were promised, plus a few others we had not planned on, and managed to blame the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The real participants, if the conference had gone as well for them as it did for us, would have felt much more successful, and the outcome of post WWI relations may have turned out differently.
(2) By the end of the conference, almost every nation at the conference had an issue with France, as they caused almost every bill to die and led to no compromise on reparations.
At the time, I don't believe so. Their alliance helped strengthen their nation and helped unify the country during a time of turmoil in the government.
Great Britain Response: I believe the disarmament was vague for one large reason that was backed by later conversations. People just lacked the knowledge. I wasn't part of the committee but from the proposal they gave it was easy to tell they didn't know true numbers. To further prove that point people thought that 50000 troops was a huge amount. But that number wouldn't be able to hold out for more than a few weeks against any of the powers. Therefore I believe lack of knowledge was the cause.
2. I think that new conflicts were definitely created. The small and new countries got under the skin of us big countries by the end and France alienated everyone. War was openly declared at the end of the conference between the Japanese and Chinese against Europe due to our weakened state. Europe was also dis-unified because France vetoed everything and the little countries demanded to much. So yes, conflict was definitely created.
3. I was frustrated. France vetoed big plans we had for foolish reasons. Because of them Africa is in chaos and we lost the territory we wanted. The real delegates must have been infuriated because they were dealing with real life.
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